University of Kansas, Fall 2006
Philosophy 666: Rational Choice Theory
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu

Preview of test on game theory

The test will be given in class on Friday, October 27. You do not need to bring anything, except for something to write with; this will be a closed-book, closed-notes exam, and you will be provided with paper on which to write your answers. At the beginning of the exam period, the following instructions will be written on the board:
  1. Please put away everything except for something to write with.
  2. This exam may be graded on a curve.
  3. Please number each of your 10 answers conspicuously.

Also, you will be asked to close and/or put away all books, notebooks, newspapers, calculators, computers, cell phones, and other possible sources of inappropriate aid. The instructions at the top of the exam will read as follows:

  1. Answer all of the following questions on the answer sheets provided. You can write on this list of questions, but credit will be awarded only for answers written on answer sheets.
  2. Do not access any book, notebook, newspaper, calculator, computer, cell phone, or other possible source of inappropriate aid during the exam, do not leave the room before you are finished taking the exam, and be sure to finish the exam within this 50-minute class period—no credit will be given for any work done after you access any possible source of inappropriate aid, after you leave the room for any reason, or after the end of this class period.
  3. When you are finished, be sure your name is written on each of your answer sheets, and turn them in. You do not need to turn in this list of questions.

Then there will be 10 questions.

  1. Question 1 will pertain to section 13 of my handouts.
  2. Question 2 pertain to section 14 of my handouts.
  3. So will question 3.
  4. Question 4 will involve identifying equilibrium strategy pairs, battles of wills, and/or prisoner’s dilemmas.
  5. So will question 5.
  6. Question 6 will concern prisoner’s dilemmas.
  7. So will question 7.
  8. Question 8 will pertain to section 15 of my handouts.
  9. Question 9 will involve computations involved in the Nash bargaining solution and the equal-relative-benefit bargaining solution.
  10. Question 10 will involve the meaning and motivation of one or more of the following:
    1. the superadditivity condition
    2. the individual-rationality condition
    3. the conditions that must be satisfied in order for one imputation to dominate another with respect to some coalition