Washington and Lee University, Winter 2002
Philosophy
395: Advanced Seminar/
University Scholars 201A: Humanities Seminar
Thursdays,
GHI (Newcomb 8)
Ben
Eggleston—home.wlu.edu/~EgglestonB
office
hours: M&F, 2–4, and T&Th, 9–11 (Newcomb 25)
An exploration of some topics at the intersection of philosophy and economics, through an investigation of questions such as the following: Can welfare reasonably be construed as preference-satisfaction? Do rational agents necessarily act so as to maximize expected utility? What is the significance of efficiency construed as Pareto-optimality? What do game theory and social-choice theory teach us about rationality? Throughout, we will seek to examine some of the materials of the economist through the lens of the philosopher.
Your active involvement in this course is crucial to the achievement of the objective just specified. So, 20 percent of your final grade will be based on your attendance, your intelligent and helpful participation in class discussions (which will based on the assigned reading), and your completion of some short in-class presentations. The remaining 80 percent of your grade will be based on three papers whose due dates and lengths are given below, in the schedule. (There will be no exam.) Further information about these assignments will be provided as needed, as well as upon request.
All of the required reading is contained in the following books and articles. I’ve asked the bookstore to get the book; the articles are listed in the order in which we’ll read them. Articles marked with a ‘W’ are available online and can be accessed via the course Web site, which is available via a link from home.wlu.edu/~EgglestonB.
Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson, Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977), pp. 317–344. (W)
Richard Arneson, “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 19, no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 158–194. (W)
Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” in Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law (University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 95–156 (originally published in the Journal of Law and Economics vol. 3 (1960), pp. 1–30; but we will use the version from the book).
Amartya Sen, “Rights and Agency,” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter 1982), pp. 3–39. (W)
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118–172 (originally published in 1958, but we will use the version from Four Essays).
Philippe van Parijs, “Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income” Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 101–130. (W)
David Gauthier, “Three Against Justice: The Foole, the Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd,” in Gauthier, Moral Dealing: Contract, Reason, and Ethics (Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 129–149 (originally published in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 7: Social and Political Philosophy (1982), pp. 11–29; but we will use the version from Moral Dealing).
Amartya Sen, “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,” Journal of Political Economy vol. 78 (1970), pp. 152–157. (W)
Amartya Sen, “Liberty and Social Choice,” Journal of Philosophy vol. 80, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 5–28. (W)
Jean Hampton, “Free-rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods” Economics and Philosophy vol. 3 (1987), pp. 245–273.
Following is a list of topics and reading assignments.
|
week |
date |
topics and reading assignments (to be done prior to class, of course) |
activities, tests, due dates for papers, etc. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
Th, 1/10 |
Introduction · H&M, chapter 1: “Ethics and economics” (pp. 3–8) · H&M, chapter 2: “Two examples” (pp. 9–21) |
|
|
2 |
Th, 1/17 |
Rationality
and Morality · H&M, introduction to part I (pp. 25–26) · H&M, chapter 3: “Rationality” (pp. 27–37) · H&M, chapter 4: “Rationality in positive and normative economics” (pp. 38–50) |
|
|
3 |
Th, 1/24 |
· H&M, chapter 5: “Rationality, norms, and morality” (pp. 51–65) · Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory” |
|
|
4 |
Th, 1/31 |
Welfare
and Consequences · H&M, introduction to part II (pp. 69–70) · H&M, chapter 6: “Welfare” (pp. 71–83) · Richard Arneson, “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare” |
in-class readings of first paper (bring two copies) |
|
5 |
Th, 2/7 |
· H&M, chapter 7: “Efficiency” (pp. 84–100) · Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost” |
paper no. 1 due (6 pages) |
|
6 |
Th, 2/14 |
· H&M, chapter 8: “Utilitarianism and Consequentialism” (pp. 101–115) · Amartya Sen, “Rights and Agency” |
|
|
|
Th, 2/21 |
[ none ] |
no class (Washington break) |
|
7 |
Th, 2/28 |
Liberty,
Rights, Equality, and Justice · H&M, introduction to part III (pp. 119–120) · H&M, chapter 9: “Liberty, Rights, and Libertarianism” (pp. 121–134) · Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” |
|
|
8 |
Th, 3/7 |
· H&M, chapter 10: “Equality and egalitarianism” (pp. 135–149) · Philippe van Parijs, “Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income” |
|
|
9 |
Th, 3/14 |
· H&M, chapter 11: “Justice and Contractualism” (pp. 150–162) · David Gauthier, “Three Against Justice: The Foole, the Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd” |
paper no. 2 due (7 pages) |
|
10 |
Th, 3/21 |
Games and Social Choice · H&M, introduction to part IV (p. 165) · H&M, chapter 12: “Social choice theory” (pp. 166–179) · Amartya Sen, “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” · Amartya Sen, “Liberty and Social Choice” |
free-rider problem game |
|
11 |
Th, 3/28 |
· H&M, chapter 13: “Game theory” (pp. 180–193) · Jean Hampton, “Free-rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods” |
|
|
12 |
Th, 4/4 |
Conclusion · H&M, “Conclusion” (pp. 197–208) |
|
|
E. |
|
|
paper no. 3 due by Wed., 4/10 (8 pages) |
revised: 1/10/02