University of Kansas, Spring 2005
Philosophy 674: Philosophy of Law
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu

Class notes: chapter 3

The following notes correspond roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own observations and records of what goes on in class.

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1. pp. 79–94—lecture based on study questions
2. pp. 94–107—lecture based on study questions
3. Griswold v. Connecticut
   1. Douglas’s argument
      1. Consider the following propositions.
         1. P: The convictions of Griswold and Buxton are unconstitutional.
         2. Q: Convictions for breaking Connecticut’s law barring the use of contraception would be unconstitutional.
         3. R: The law barring the use of contraception is unconstitutional.
         4. S: The right to use contraception is contained in the penumbra of some of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
         5. T: The right to use contraception is part of a right to privacy that is contained in the penumbra of some of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
         6. U: The right to use contraception, and the rest of the right to privacy contained in the penumbra of the some of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, is necessary to make the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights fully meaningful.
      2. Then it seems that Douglas’s argument can be represented as follows.
         1. P if Q.
         2. Q if R.
         3. R if S.
         4. S if T.
         5. T if U
         6. U.
         7. Therefore, P.
   2. Black’s objections
      1. The amendments cited by the majority opinion are not really about privacy.
      2. The government can invade your privacy except when specifically prohibited from doing so.
4. “Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief”—lecture based on study questions
5. Washington v. Glucksberg—Rehnquist’s argument
   1. Consider the following propositions.
      1. P: Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide is consistent with the Constitution.
      2. Q: The right to physician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due Process Clause.
      3. R: The right to physician-assisted suicide is not deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the United States.
      4. S: The right to physician-assisted suicide cannot be “carefully described.”
      5. T: Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
   2. Then it seems that Rehnquist’s argument can be represented as follows.
      1. P is true if Q and T are true.
      2. Q is true if R or S is true.
      3. R is true.
      4. T is true.
      5. Therefore, P is true.