University of Kansas, Spring 2004
Philosophy 555: Justice and Economic Systems
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu
Class notes: Rawls, preface and chapter 1
The following notes correspond
roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the
board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we
actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own
observations and records of what goes on in class.
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-
preface
- vs. utilitarianism: Rawls makes it clear that he does not accept
utilitarianism, and is offering his own theory as an alternative to
utilitarianism (p. xvii.6). (This will be elaborated later.)
- vs. intuitionism: Rawls also makes it clear that he does not accept intuitionism,
and means for his theory not to be a form of intuitionism (p. xvii.9). (This will also be
elaborated later.)
- social-contract theory: Rawls regards himself as developing a more
sophisticated version of the idea of the social contract, as found in Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant (p. xviii.2)
-
chapter 1: “Justice as Fairness”
- p. 4.7: what a conception of justice is for: assigning
basic rights and duties and distributing benefits and burdens (also p. 6.3)
- § 2: the subject of justice: the basic structure of society. This
includes
- the way in which major social institutions distribute fundamental rights
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation
- the political constitution and the major economic and social arrangements
- examples: freedom of speech, private property, monogamous family
- not the activities of private associations
- not international relations
- p. 5.4: concept vs. conception
- A conception is a specification of a concept; a concept presents a problem
and a conception presents a solution to it (Korsgaard). See also p. 9.4–6.
- p. 5.3–6: The concept of justice involves the notions of
arbitrariness (lack thereof) and of striking a proper balance between things;
a conception of justice offers interpretations of arbitrariness and
propriety.
- p. 14.3: contractarian theory
- two parts
- a specification of the initial situation (Rawls’s is called the original
position)
- a set of principles that, it is claimed, would be agreed to
- the scheme of the argument
- The original position is a fair (or otherwise morally significant)
interpretation of the initial situation.
- The conception of justice (“the two principles”) that Rawls defends would be chosen in the original
position.
- Therefore, the two principles that Rawls defends are the best conception
of justice.
- So, one might agree with Rawls that the original position is the best
interpretation of the initial situation but dispute that the principles Rawls
defends would be selected there; or one might agree with Rawls that the
principles he defends would be selected in the original position but dispute
that the original position is a fair (or otherwise morally significant)
interpretation of the initial situation. Or one might disagree with both of
Rawls’s premises.
- pp. 16–17: the original position
- need for specification of the original position (p. 16.3)
- p. 16.6: “weak” premises (see also pp. 111.9–112.1)
- veil of ignorance (p. 17.3)
- §§ 5–6: utilitarianism
- considerations in favor
- extension of the principle of choice for the individual to the
social context (p. 21)
- defining right in terms of good (specifically, maximization of
the good) (pp. 21–22)
- objections
- p. 23.6: according to utilitarianism “there is no reason in principle why
the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of
others; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might
not be made right by the greater good shared by many.”
- p. 24.7: “Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between
persons.”
- three contrasts
- convictions about the priority of justice: sound commitment vs.
social useful illusion (p. 25.6)
- principles of justice: object of agreement vs. extension of
intrapersonal principle of choice (p. 25.7)
- principles of justice: deontological vs. teleological (p. 26.6) (See also
p. 28.1, on the priority of the right to the good.)
- p. 29.7: clear statement of the main contrast
- § 7–8: intuitionism and the priority problem
- p. 30.5: The essential feature of intuitionism, for Rawls, is that there
are no rules for settling conflicts among moral principles. You just have to
use your judgment.
- p. 32.7: An example of an intuitionist approach is that we need to balance
equality and total welfare.
- p. 34.3: The problem with intuitionism is expressed here—that an
intuitionist conception of justice allows different persons to arrive at
different judgments, and provides no way of discriminating among them. In
other words, intuitionism fails to solve the priority problem.
- Justice as fairness solves, or partially solves, the priority problem in
three ways.
- by making the principles of justice an object of choice—obviously choosers
will not be content to settle on anything too vague or variable, if it will be
employed to regulate the basic structure of their society
- by putting principles in lexical order
- by asking narrowed questions: prudential not moral, worst-off not
everyone. (More on this later.)
- justification
- reflective equilibrium: seeking a theory that meshes with our considered
judgments
- p. 17.8: considered convictions
- p. 18.3: ”work from both ends”
- moral theory
- not merely descriptive; this would be too conservative (p. 42.7)
- p. 43.2–3: Rawls’s criterion for selecting a moral theory