University of Kansas, Spring 2004
Philosophy 555: Justice and Economic Systems
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu
Class notes: Nozick, chapters 5–6
The following notes correspond
roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the
board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we
actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own
observations and records of what goes on in class.
The following outline is designed to
be, and is in some Web browsers, collapsible: by clicking on the heading for a
section, you can collapse that section or, if it’s already collapsed, make it
expanded again. If you want to print some but not all of this outline, collapse
the parts you don’t want to print (so that just their top-level headings
remain), and then click here to print this frame.
- chapter 5: “The State”
- from the dominant protective association to the ultra-minimal state
- the ultra-minimal state
- what this means: a monopoly on (the en)force(ment of rights)
- what this doesn’t mean: protecting everyone (this is how the ultra-minimal
state falls short of the state)
- problems with the transition to the ultra-minimal state
- Even if the totality of independents were dangerous, not every (or any)
independent is, and the dominant protective association doesn’t have the right
to single out any particular independent(s) as the one(s) to interfere with
(p. 89.3).
- The principle of fairness doesn’t give a group the right to coerce an
individual, as the example of the public-address system shows (p. 93.6).
- The natural-rights tradition gives very little guidance about procedural
rights, though it does hold “that one may . . . defend oneself against being
handled by unreliable or unfair procedures” (p. 101.4)
- making the transition
- Since “a person may resist, in self-defense, if others try to apply to him
an unreliable or unfair procedure of justice” (p. 102.7), individuals in a
protective association may empower it to do this on their behalf (p. 102.8).
- p. 105.3: ”The protective agency may treat the unreliable enforcer of
justice as it treats any performer of a risky action.”
- The protective agency may treat the unreliable enforcer of justice in this
way even when the unreliable enforcer of justice happens to be getting it
right (p. 107.3), and this claim does not depend on any procedural rights
of the (guilty) person being punished (p. 107.8).
- the establishment of a de facto monopoly (p. 109.5)
- from the ultra-minimal state to the state
- protecting independents
- The protective agency owes protection to independents in exchange from
prohibiting them from doing their own rights-enforcing (p. 110.8).
- To support this service, it may require such individuals to pay it the
monetary costs of self-help enforcement that they would have incurred if they
had been permitted to engage in self-help enforcement (p. 112.7).
- redistribution
- What the agency collects from independents may not be sufficient to cover
the cost of the service (pp. 112.9–113.1).
- This means that there is a redistributive element (p. 114.2).
- But this is not fundamentally redistributive; it is based on the principle
of compensation (p. 114.4).
- end of the explanation; note that it is an invisible-hand
explanation (p. 119.9)
- chapter 6: “Further Considerations on the Argument for the State”
- big question: We have seen that it is o.k. to forbid
others to punish you with an unreliable procedure, on the grounds that it’s
dangerous for you when others engage in such conduct. Does this mean it’s also
o.k. to prohibiting others from joining another protective association, or
keeping another protective association from getting very strong, on the
grounds that it’s dangerous for you when these things happen, too? (p. 125.7)
- answer: No—“We have put forth a principle which excludes
prohibiting actions not wrong in themselves, actions that merely facilitate or
make more likely the commission of other wrongs dependent upon other wrong
decisions the agent has not made (yet)” (p. 129.6).