University of Kansas, Spring 2003
Philosophy 555: Justice and Economic Systems
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu

Class notes: Unger

The following notes correspond roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own observations and records of what goes on in class.

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  1. chapter 1: “Illusions of Innocence: An Introduction”
    1. aims
      1. to show that it’s seriously wrong for well-off people not to do anything to lessen distant suffering (pp. 7.9–8.1)
      2. to show that living a morally decent life requires “terribly costly” sacrifices by well-off people (p. 14.3)
    2. basic concepts
      1. the truth about morality
      2. our Basic Moral Values (which pretty well reflect the truth about morality)
      3. our intuitive reactions to particular cases (which may or may not reflect our Basic Moral Values)
    3. Preservationism and Liberationism
      1. Preservationism
        1. the majority view (p. 10.7)
        2. intuitive responses to particular cases taken to reflect our Basic Moral Values (p. 11.1–3)
        3. no “antecendent morally substantive aspect” to this view, since the substance is distilled from our responses to particular cases (p. 11.6)
      2. Liberationism
        1. the minority view (p. 10.7)
        2. a morally substantive core, regarding helping others (p. 12.5)
        3. intuitive responses to particular cases taken to reflect our Basic Moral Values sometimes, but often  to be derived from distortional tendencies (p. 11.7)
        4. example: our harsh reaction to Shallow Pond reflects our Basic Moral Values; our lenient reaction to  Envelope does not
    4. examples of distortional tendencies
      1. the puzzle about Washington, Jefferson, and slavery in modern Australia
      2. Our Idea of Moral Progress (p. 18.9–19.1)
      3. three distortional tendencies
        1. underrating some behavior, such as that of the slaveholding Australians (p. 19.8)
        2. overrating some behavior, such as that of Washington and Jefferson (p. 19.8)
        3. overrating our own behavior, such as our throwing away UNICEF envelopes (p. 20.1)
  2. chapter 2: “Living High and Letting Die: A Puzzle About Behavior Toward People in Great Need”
    1. the puzzle
      1. the Vintage Sedan vs. the Envelope
      2. why harshness only toward the former, and not toward the latter as well? (p. 26.5)
      3. five factors intensifying the puzzle
        1. cost ($100 vs. $5,000)
        2. people affected (30 vs. 1)
        3. losses suffered (life vs. limb)
        4. whether victim is responsible (no vs. yes)
        5. whether victim is guilty (no vs. yes)
      4. morally significant differentiating factors resolving the puzzle?
    2. six alleged differences (these are phrased from the point of view of the Envelope; use opposites for the Sedan) (p. 54, n. 16):
      1. worsening the further future (section 4)
      2. governments’ responsibility (6)
      3. helping only a small fraction of needy people (7)
      4. not “cleaning the scene” (8)
      5. urgency (10)
      6. not truly saving someone (12)
    3. nine differences that don’t make a moral difference (these are true of the Sedan; use opposites for the Envelope) (pp. 53.9–54.1)
      1. physical proximity (section 3)
      2. social proximity (3)
      3. informative directness (3)
      4. experiential impact (3)
      5. unique potential savior (5)
      6. emergency (9)
      7. causal focus (11)
      8. epistemic focus (13)
      9. goods and services (14)
    4. Unger’s method for each factor
      1. to show that it is morally irrelevant from the perspective of our “general moral common sense,” reflecting our Basic Moral Values (p. 28.3)
      2. to show that it is morally irrelevant from the perspective of moral intuitions about particular cases (p. 28.3)
      3. occasional discrepancies due to differences in conspicuousness (p. 28.8)
    5. example of the method
      1. general moral common sense—“moral force doesn’t diminish with distance” (p. 33.8)
      2. particular cases
        1. one differing from the Envelope mainly in respect of distance—The Bungalow Compound, to which people react as leniently as to the Envelope (p. 34.3–6)
        2. one differing from the Sedan mainly in respect of distance—the CB Radio, to which people react as harshly as to the Sedan (pp. 34.7–35.2)
    6. clarifications
      1. “hit the issue from just one side” (p. 35.5)
      2. “pretty high epistemic standards” (p. 39.9)
      3. “where people’s great needs are inconspicuous to the cases’ agents” (p. 54.3)
    7. implications of our Primary Moral Values
      1. no moral significance to salience (p. 55.4)
      2. Envelope’s conduct as bad as Sedan’s (p. 55.8)
      3. the objection that this implies that ethics is highly demanding
        • reply: no more so than does a strict judgment towards Sedan’s behavior (p. 56.9)
      4. the objection that different cases fall into different sorts
        • reply: morally relevant sorts already accounted for in factors examined (p. 60.3)
  3. chapter 3: “Living High, Stealing and Letting Die: The Main Truth of Some Related Puzzles”
    1. the main related puzzle
      1. the Yacht vs. the Account
      2. why a positive judgment towards the former, and a negative judgment towards the latter? (p. 65.8)
      3. some factors intensifying the puzzle
        1. more good done in the Account
        2. less expense in the Account
    2. five more differences that don’t make a moral difference (these are true of the Yacht; use opposites for the Account) (pp. 74.1–2)
      1. (10.) property instead of mere money (section 4) (also true of Sedan)
      2. (11.) direct use instead of conversion (4) (also true of Sedan)
      3. (12.) taking instead of stealing (2)
      4. (13.) no “additional morally suspect features” (3)
      5. (14.) merely foreseen, not intended as means (5)
    3. subjective factors
      1. negative
        1. futility thinking (pp. 75.9–76.3)
        2. repeatability thinking (p. 80.2)
        3. projective separating—see next chapter (p. 80.2)
      2. positive
        1. conspicuousness (p. 28.8, p. 76.4)
        2. dramatic trouble (p. 78.2)
        3. descriptive segregation (p. 79.5)
      3. proof of these as explanatory
        1. explanation of puzzles
        2. examples of horrors in a “perennially decent world” (pp. 80–82)
  4. chapter 4: “Between Some Rocks and Some Hard Places: On Causing and Preventing Serious Loss”
    1. another puzzle
      1. the Foot vs. the Trolley
      2. why a negative judgment towards the former, and a positive judgment towards the latter? (p. 87.5)
      3. some factors intensifying the puzzle (p. 87.7)
        1. more good done in the Foot
        2. less harm in the Foot
    2. more negative subjective factors
      1. projective separating (section 5)
      2. protophysics (section 6)
      3. pushing, negative stereotypes, psychological proximity (section 7)
    3. remedies
      1. method of several options (p. 91.3)
      2. method of combining (p. 107.8)
    4. Liberation Hypothesis vs. Fanaticism Hypothesis
      1. Liberation Hypothesis: additional options free us from distortional factors (p. 94.7–9)
      2. Fanaticism Hypothesis: additional options make us fanatically emphasize lessening losses over observing morally more significant prohibitions (such as prohibitions against harming others) (p. 95.1–3)
        1. the Explosive Form: we “explosively” judge any loss-lessening conduct well (p. 115.7)
        2. the Distractive Form: we get distracted by multiple options and fail to judge well (p. 117.2)
  5. chapter 5: “Between Some Harder Rocks and Rockier Hard Places: On Distortional Separating and Revelatory Grouping”
    1. two strange psychological phenomena
      1. the Phenomenon of No Threshold (p. 119.8)
      2. the Phenomenon of Near-Tiebreaker (p. 121.7)
    2. two more puzzles
      1. Envelope vs. Bank Card (p. 125.5)
      2. Heart Card vs. Lesser Loss Card (p. 128.4)
    3. explanations
      1. projective grouping in the Lesser Loss Card, projective separating in the Heart Card
      2. projective grouping in the Bank Card, projective separating in the Envelope
  6. chapter 6: “Living High and Letting Die Reconsidered: On the Costs of a Morally Decent Life”
    1. one argument for significant sacrifice
      1. Bob, Ray, and us (pp. 135.5–139.7)
      2. salience, excitement, and projective grouping (pp. 137.7–138.5)
    2. another argument for significant sacrifice
      1. weak principle of ethical integrity (p. 140.5)
      2. note avoidance of insistence on absolute impartiality
    3. non-material costs
      1. getting a well-paying job (p. 151.4–8)
      2. being politically active (p. 152.3–4)
  7. chapter 7: “Metaethics, Better Ethics: From Complex Semantics to Simple Decency”
    1. conflicting judgments of the Envelope’s conduct (p. 158.7)
      1. harshness in book
      2. lenience in ordinary life
    2. a selectively flexible semantics
      1. context sensitivity (p. 163.4)
      2. multiple dimensions (p. 164.7)
      3. Primary and Secondary Values (p. 168.2–5)
        • “epistemico-ethical fallibility” (p. 170.8)
      4. how high the “passing” bar is set (pp. 169.9–170.1)