University of Kansas, Fall 2003
Philosophy 672: History of Ethics
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu

Class notes: postscript

The following notes correspond roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own observations and records of what goes on in class.

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50. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958)
    1. possible test questions
       1. (10 points:) What are the two senses of words like ‘ought’ and ‘should’ that Anscombe distinguishes?
       2. (10 points:) In what way, according to Anscombe, does the notion of moral obligation depend, for its meaning, on an approach to ethics that used to be prevalent, but that is now discredited?
    2. pp. 1.6–3.5: We can find no elucidation of the concept of the moral (as opposed to the non-moral, not as opposed to the immoral) in the work of Aristotle or more recent philosophers.
    3. p. 5.3: two conceptions of ‘should’ and ‘ought’
       1. as in “machinery should be oiled”
       2. a distinctly moral sense
    4. p.  5.6–7: how this “special sense” of such words came about: the law conception of ethics (permission, prohibition, etc.)
    5. p. 6.9: “The situation . . .”
    6. pp. 8.2–9.2: the notion of morality
       1. p. 8.3–4: no concept
       2. p. 8.9: should be dropped
       3. p. 9.1: what should replace it
    7. others sources of normativity besides a divine legislator
       1. p. 13.7: the “norms” of a society
       2. p. 13.8: legislating for oneself
       3. p. 14.3: a contract
       4. p. 14.8: human virtues
    8. p. 15.4: ‘ought’ meant non-emphatically; replacing ‘wrong’ with ‘unjust’, etc.
    9. p. 17.8: ‘morally wrong‘ as residue from divine-law ethics
    10. p. 1: three theses
        1. first one: not our concern
        2. second one: our concern
        3. third one: not our concern
51. Annas, “Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality” (1992)
    1. possible test questions
       1. (20 points:) Annas considers, and tries to minimize, five ways in which ancient ethics and modern moral philosophy are often regarded as fundamentally different. What are three of the first four of these five ways? (You don’t have to explain Annas’s position on the differences you mention. You just have to explain three of the first four of the differences that she is concerned with.)
       2. (10 points:) A pithy summary of the fifth difference between ancient ethics and modern moral philosophy that Annas discusses is the statement that ancient ethics is often seen as essentially egoistic, while modern moral philosophy is often seen as essentially impartial. Explain the difference between ancient ethics and modern moral philosophy that this statement is getting at.
    2. Annas’s aim
       1. p. 119.8: “widespread attitude . . .”
       2. p. 120.2: “it is widely taken . . .”
       3. p. 120.3: “that ancient ethics is ancient morality”
    3. “Moral and non-moral reasons”
       1. The standard story in modern moral philosophy is that moral reasons are more compelling; they’re overriding.
       2. But, it is said, there are not not two kinds of practical reasons in ancient ethics; there’s just reasoning well about things.
       3. But in ancient ethics (especially in the theories of the Stoics), we find certain reasons’ being regarded as silencing others, as moral reasons do according to modern moral philosophy.
       4. Also, in ancient ethics (especially in the theory of Aristotle), we find certain things’ being done because they are good, paralleling the modern view of moral actions’ being done for their own sake
    4. “Moral responsibility”
       1. It is often thought that in ancient ethics, it is implied that people are morally responsible for things that were not up to them. This suspicion is buttressed by the understanding of what is often called “virtue” as, rather, “excellence.”
       2. But in ancient ethics there is an emphasis on the voluntary, and on freedom of choice, that mirrors the modern concern with holding agents morally responsible for things that are up to them.
    5. “Scope”
       1. It is often thought, especially by those who take Aristotle’s ethics to be representative of ancient ethics, that in ancient ethics the scope of morality is much wider than it is in modern moral philosophy.
       2. But this feature of Aristotle’s ethics is not representative of ancient ethics, and it is not so clear after all that morality concerned with such a narrow part of one’s life.
    6. “Actions and agents”
       1. It is often thought that modern morality is act-centered and that ancient ethics is agent-centered.
       2. But this is more a difference of emphasis than a sharp divide, as shown by the important role of rules in theories of both kinds.
    7. “Myself and others”
       1. It is often thought that ancient ethical theories do not insist on the impartiality that is characteristic of modern morality.
       2. But some ancient ethical theories did (such as those of the Stoics); and besides, it’s a matter of debate whether modern ones should.