University of Kansas, Fall 2003
Philosophy 672: History of Ethics
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu
Class notes:
Kant
The following notes correspond
roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the
board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we
actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own
observations and records of what goes on in class.
The following outline is designed to
be, and is in some Web browsers, collapsible: by clicking on the heading for a
section, you can collapse that section or, if it’s already collapsed, make it
expanded again. If you want to print some but not all of this outline, collapse
the parts you don’t want to print (so that just their top-level headings
remain), and then click here to print this frame.
-
biographical note
- Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg, in
East Prussia. His early writings concern the sciences, especially physics
and astronomy. He even predicted the existence of planets beyond Saturn more
than twenty years before Uranus was actually discovered.
- In 1770, he took a
philosophical post at the University of Königsberg and embarked on a series
of works that would make him, by almost anyone’s reckoning, the most
influential of all the modern philosophers. His Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, published in 1785, is an indispensable part of
the history of ethical theory.
-
preface
- possible test questions
- (20 points:) Kant aims, in the Groundwork, to articulate and
establish a synthetic principle that is knowable a priori. First, what
does it mean for a principle to be synthetic rather than analytic (5 points)?
Second, why does Kant want to establish a principle that is synthetic rather
than analytic (5 points)? Third, what does is mean for a principle to be knowable a
priori rather than a posteriori (5 points)? Fourth, why does Kant insist that
whatever is established be established a priori rather than a
posteriori (5 points)?
- (10 points:) Kant thinks that common-sense morality is neither seriously
flawed nor entirely adequate as it stands. In what way does Kant approve of
common-sense morality (e.g., in what respect does he think it’s all right, or
on the right track), and yet what important role does he think there is for
moral philosophy to serve?
- empiricism and rationalism
- Empiricists hold that all our knowledge and ideas, including our beliefs
about morality, are derived from experience.
- Rationalists hold that at least some truths can be derived from
self-evident principles, or known through the use of reason alone, without
input from experience.
- Some rationalists hold that all truths can be derived in this way, but
most rationalists don’t. Kant is in the latter group.
- the division of the sciences
- formal: logic
- material
- related to nature (what does happen): physics
- rational part: metaphysics of nature
- empirical part: physics proper (empirical physics)
- related to freedom (what ought to happen): ethics
- rational part: metaphysics of morals
- empirical part: practical anthropology
- the distinction between a priori and a posteriori (Korsgaard,
p. ix)
- These terms concern how we know the things we know.
- We know things a posteriori when we know them because of some
experience: for example, I know that water boils only after several minutes on
the stove, or that the Kansas River is very low right now, only because of
experience: I’ve boiled water, and seen the river, and that’s how I know
things about them.
- We know things a priori when we know them even without having to
check them against experience. For example, the way I know that ice is frozen
water is not because of some experience, as it is in the case of things known
a posteriori. Once I become familiar with the concepts of water
and ice (and frozen and one thing being another, I
suppose) I’m able to know that ice is frozen water. Admittedly, I have to have
had the experience of learning these concepts, but this does not turn the
judgment we’re talking about into one that is known a posteriori.
To see why, go back to the judgment that water boils only after several
minutes on the stove. That I cannot know just by the experience of learning the concepts;
further experience (first-hand or otherwise) is needed to see how long it
takes for water to boil on the stove. But with the judgment that ice is frozen
water, the concepts are enough.
- Kant’s concern with what can be known a priori
- Kant is concerned, in this book, with what we can know about ethics a
priori—that is, what we can learn just by sitting in our armchairs and
thinking about ethics (given that we have acquired the concepts we need to
work with).
- These, then, are things that we can know without going out and seeing how people behave, interviewing
them about their moral beliefs, etc.
- Kant’s principal motive for emphasizing the distinction between rational
and empirical parts of moral philosophy comes through on p. 389, in the
paragraph beginning with ‘Since’. There he explains that he conceives of the
moral law as applying to all rational beings, not just (e.g.) human
beings. So, in order to do moral philosophy right, we must abstract from all
the things about human beings that are not essential to them as rational
beings. This point is made again at the end of p. 390.
- the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic
- Whereas the a priori / a posteriori distinction pertains to
how judgments are known, the analytic/synthetic distinction pertains the the
judgments themselves.
- An analytic judgment is one whose predicate is, it is said, “contained” in
the concept of the subject. So, to recall an earlier example: the judgment
that ice is frozen water is analytic because the predicate of being frozen
water is contained in the concept of ice. All you have to do is
analyze the concept ice, and the rest of the judgment follows.
- A synthetic judgment is one whose predicate is not contained in the
concept of the subject. Again, to recall an earlier example: the judgment that
water boils only after several minutes on the stove is synthetic because how
long it takes water to boil is not implicit in the concept of water
itself; no amount of analyzing that concept is going to tell you
anything about how long it takes. Rather, the judgment that water takes a
while to boil synthesizes the concept of water and another
concept that isn’t contained in the concept of water.
- So far it might appear the the analytic/synthetic distinction and the a
priori / a posteriori distinction are just two different ways of expressing
the same distinction: that all and only analytic judgments are known a priori,
and that all and only synthetic judgments are known a posteriori.
- In
practice there is a great deal of overlap.
- But what Kant is looking for in
this book is a synthetic moral principle that is known a priori: that
is, he’s trying to keep all the empirical stuff out (i.e., know something a
priori), but make that something more substantial than just an analysis of
some moral concept or other. To know something synthetic a priori would be
quite a feat, and this is just what Kant says he’s after.
- the motive of duty
- On p. 390, we find the first mention of a quintessentially Kantian claim:
that, order for an action to be morally good, it must be done not just in
conformity to the moral law, but for the sake of the moral law. He
says this is so because other motives (aside from the motive of duty) “will
often produce actions contrary to the [moral] law.”
- So the argument seems to be something like this:
- All actions done from motives other than that of duty are actions done
from motives that will often produce actions contrary to the moral law.
- All actions done from motives that will often produce actions contrary to
the moral law fail to be morally good.
- Therefore, all actions done from motives other than that of duty fail to
be morally good.
- Presumably premise 2 is doing the bulk of the work, and may be questioned.
(Some considerations in support of it can be gleaned from Barbara Herman’s
paper, which we’ll consider shortly.)
- Kant and common-sense morality
- About halfway through p. 391, we find one of Kant’s most important
assumptions: that “in moral matters human reason can easily be brought to a
high degree of correctness and accomplishment, even in the most common
understanding.” This confidence Kant has in common-sense morality informs his
work throughout, and makes his task of one unearthing the theoretical basis of
common-sense morality rather than (he thinks) revising it in any very
substantial way.
- On p. 392, Kant says that the purpose of this book is to find and
establish “the supreme principle of morality.” By this he means some
fundamental principle that can guide action in all circumstances.
- section I
- possible test questions
- (10 points:) Why, according to Kant, is it the case that only a good will
is unqualifiedly or unconditionally good? (Why aren’t things like intelligence
and happiness also unconditionally good?)
- (10 points:) What is the connection between the concept of a good will
and the concept of duty such that an analysis of the latter will
clarify the meaning of the former?
- purpose
- Before getting into the substance of this section, we should recall what
Kant says its purpose is, both as reflected in its title and in Kant’s
description of it in the preface.
- The title is “Transition from Common Rational to Philosophic Moral
Cognition,” and in the last paragraph of the preface Kant says that his first
task will be to proceed analytically.
- So we can take Kant in this first section to be analyzing common rational
cognition in philosophical terms—that is, trying to pick apart common-sense
morality and see what’s really there, and re-organizing and reassembling those
ingredients within a philosophical framework.
- the good will
- One very distinctively Kantian doctrine is that the only thing that is
unconditionally good is a good will (p. 393).
- Other things—intelligence, courage, riches, etc.—may on occasion be good,
but only on the condition that they are under the control of a good will.
Otherwise they can be quite bad. Even happiness and equanimity, which seem to
come close to being unconditionally good, we rightly regard as bad when they
are enjoyed by someone “with a no feature of a pure and good will” (p. 393) or
“a scoundrel” (p. 394).
- And, relatedly, the good will is good not because of what it accomplishes,
but quite independently of its effects.
- an objection and Kant’s reply
- It might be objected (beginning of p. 395) that what makes a will good, or
any of the faculties of the human mind good, is that it conduces to our
survival and happiness. For this is what nature seems to have in mind for us.
- Kant’s reply is that it doesn’t make sense to think of the human will
(governed by reason) as aiming at human survival and happiness, because that
aim is much better served by instinct than by reason (p. 395). But since
nature clearly has given us reason, we must identify some other purpose for
it; and since reason is given to us as a practical faculty—i.e., one that can
influence the will—then nature must have meant for reason to operate on the
will so as to make it good (p. 396). Kant adds that this aim takes
precedence over that of happiness, which he agrees nature has also apparently
set as an aim for us, but he is not explicit here about why reason’s aim (of
making the will good) ought to take precedence over instinct’s aim (of
ensuring survival and happiness).
- Kant’s analysis of the good will (beginning on p. 397)
- the good will as viewed by common sense
- Note that Kant says that this concept “already dwells in natural sound
understanding and needs not so much to be taught as only to be clarified” (p.
397).
- This goes with Kant’s saying, earlier (p. 391), that common-sense
morality is already in pretty good shape, substantively, and needs only to be
set on a firmer foundation.
- understanding the concept of a good will by understanding the concept of
duty (p. 397)
- performing an action with a good will and performing it from the motive of
duty
- Kant apparently regards these two as the same thing.
- Performing an action from the motive of duty is also called performing an
action from duty.
- cases to distinguish to isolate what we’re interested in (p. 397)
- actions not in conformity to duty
- These are obviously not done from duty, in Kant’s view.
- Kant seems to be assuming that if you act from duty, you’ll succeed: that
there aren’t any acts that are done from duty, but that then go awry and fail
to conform to duty.
- actions in conformity to duty
- actions done only because the agent is impelled to do so—also not done
from duty
- actions done only from self-interest—also not done from duty
- actions done only from immediate inclination—also not done from duty
- actions done from no impulsion, interest, or inclination, but from duty
- It is unclear here whether Kant means to maintain that every action is
done “from” just one thing (inclination, duty, etc.).
- If he maintains that this is so, then this seems rather strange. For it
would seem that a person can (e.g.) tell the truth both in order to maintain a
reputation for honesty and because doing so is morally required.
- If he does not insist on this, then there are two things Kant might be
saying, between which we have to choose.
- An action is good only if it’s done from duty, even if it’s also done from
something else.
- An action is good only if it’s done only from duty.
- why actions done from duty are good
- Near the end of p. 399 Kant mentions the “second proposition.” (Apparently
we were to take the first proposition to be that only a good will—that is, a
will that acts from duty—is unconditionally good.)
- The second proposition is
that what makes an action done from duty good lies not in the purpose
at which the action aims, but in the maxim, or principle, or (moral) law, by
which it is decided upon.
- This he takes to follow from what he had said
earlier, about various aims’ being good or bad, depending on the
circumstances.
- the connection between duty and respect for law
- On p. 400 Kant states the third proposition: “duty is the necessity of an
action from respect for law.”
- What he means by ‘necessity’ is that when you regard an action as required
by (the moral) law, you think of it as something that it is necessary for you
to do: it strikes you as the thing to do, rather than just an option.
- He says this follows from the first two propositions. His thought seems to
be something like this: since all the things that are aimed at by interest,
inclination, etc., can be brought about without the operation of the
will of a rational being, the operation of the will of a rational being must
find its goodness, when it is good, in some other source. And this other
source must be the very idea of (moral) law, as something worth following for
its own sake rather than for the sake of any further end.
- the moral law
- Beginning on p. 402 Kant further specifies what it means for someone to
act from duty, or (what he has argued is the same thing) purely out of respect
for law.
- He says that it means acting on this principle: “I ought never to act
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a
universal law.”
- In considering Kant’s discussion here it’s important to understand what
Kant is claiming and what he’s not claiming. He is claiming that the
principle is implicit in common-sense morality. He’s not claiming that he’s
proved it, or established it, philosophically, only that (to repeat) he’s
found it in common-sense morality after analyzing common-sense morality.
Kant’s attempt to prove it will come later. Note, for example, Kant’s claim on
p. 402 that “Common human reason . . . always has this principle before its
eyes,” and his more explicit allusion to this objection at the end of p. 403.
- Here it might be objected that, given that Kant takes himself here still
to be analyzing common-sense morality, then he has gone way off course, since
surely it cannot be said that common-sense morality contains any principle as
convoluted as this one as some essential ingredient. But Kant goes on to
explain how this principle is implicit in common-sense morality, by reference
to the example of the false promise. We learn from Kant’s discussion on p. 403
that the principle basically means, “Don’t make an exception of yourself.”
- Kant on common-sense morality
- Kant’s confidence in common-sense morality
- p. 403.3: “I do not . . . need any penetrating acuteness to see what I have
to do . . . . Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being
prepared for whatever might come to pass in it,” I can still figure out my
duties.
- p. 404.2: “it would be easy to show . . . that there is . . . no need of
science and philosophy to know what one has to do in order to be honest and
good, even wise and virtuous.”
- p. 404.7: common understanding “can even have as good a hope of hitting the
mark as any philosopher can promise himself.”
- the need for moral philosophy
- p. 405: “reason [which forms the basis of duty] issues its precepts
unremittingly, without thereby promising anything to the inclinations. . . .
But from this there arises a . . . propensity to rationalize against those
strict laws of duty.” That is, we are liable, under pressure from our
inclinations, to entertain corrupted conceptions of our duties, even though,
in a sense, we know better.
- p. 405: “In this way common human reason is impelled, not by some
need of speculation . . . but on practical grounds themselves, to go out of
its sphere and to take a step into the field of practical philosophy.”
That is, moral philosophy will not just help us understand morality
better; it will help us act more in accordance with it.
- “critique of our reason” (end of p. 405)
- It is important to understand that Kant is using ‘critique’ in his special
sense of ‘study’ or ‘examination,’ not in a particularly negative way. As we
will see, Kant thinks that pure reason can be quite potent.
- So understood, this last sentence reminds us of the overall structure of
Kant’s project: he has analyzed common-sense morality; what must follow is an
inquiry into whether the substance of common-sense morality can be given firm
philosophical foundations (and this latter task is what will involve a
“critique” of reason—note, though, that this project, properly so called, is
carried out Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, not in the
Groundwork; though there is some overlap).
- Herman, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty”
- possible text question
- (20 points:) What is the problem with section I of Kant’s Groundwork
that Herman addresses, and what is the standard purported solution to this
problem? (You don’t have to say what Herman’s objection to the standard
purported solution is, or what her own solution is.)
- section I
- Henson’s article
- Herman discusses a then-recent article by Richard Henson.
- For the most part we are not concerned with what she says about this
earlier paper.
- the problem that gives rise to Henson’s and Herman’s papers
- Rather, our concern is simply with the problem that gives rise to Henson’s
and Herman’s papers.
- That problem is this: Kant seems to imply that only actions done only from
the motive of duty have moral worth, and this seems to imply that right
actions done grudgingly, or against one’s inclinations, have more moral worth
than do right actions done willingly or with pleasure. This is taken to be a
problem in Kant interpretation because it attributes to Kant a very
hard-hearted view.
- section II
- non-moral motives and their lack of moral worth
- Herman’s first concern in this section is to explain why non-moral
motives—such as those that motivate the shopkeeper and the sympathetic person—do
not give their dutiful actions moral worth (p. 363.1).
- The shopkeeper, even in doing the dutiful thing (giving correct change)
acts from the motive of profit, and the problem with this is that it is
unreliable in getting people to do the right thing (p. 363.7).
- The sympathetic person acts, of course, from sympathy, and the although
sympathy is not as unreliable as the profit motive is (p. 364.4), it’s still
essentially unreliable (p. 365.1): not all sympathetic or benevolent acts
are right acts.
- a necessary condition for moral worth
- Based on the foregoing, Herman asserts this: “For a motive to be a moral
motive, it must provide the agent with an interest in the moral rightness of
his actions.” And an action has moral worth only when the agent acted from a
moral motive—i.e., with an interest in the moral rightness of his action (p.
366.8).
- This seems to establish a necessary condition, but not a sufficient
condition, for the attribution of moral worth to an action. Indeed Herman says
that we can't yet specify these conditions (p. 366.4).
- section III
- topic: cases of overdetermination (p. 367.1).
- the common way of dealing with this problem
- The common way of dealing with this problem is to say that an
overdetermined action has moral worth if and only if the agent’s interest in
the moral rightness of his action would have been sufficient, by itself, to
get the agent to do the action (p. 367.3). Herman says this can be interpreted
in a couple of ways, each of which is problematic.
- the two interpretations
- First, it can mean that cooperating motives (those that cooperate with the
motive of duty) are to be set aside; then we see whether the moral motive
would have been sufficient by itself (p. 367.3)
- Second, it can mean that cooperating motives are to be set aside, and that
conflicting motives may remain; then we see whether the moral motive would
have been sufficient to overcome the conflicting motives (p. 367.4).
- Herman’s problem: each of these specifies a condition (for an action’s
having moral worth) that is too easy to satisfy. For a person might pass
either of these tests, with the following still being true: if circumstances
were to change, so that the cooperating motives become conflicting motives,
then the person would no longer do the right thing. And yet if this last thing
were true, then surely the agent wouldn’t deserve to be said to have been
acting from duty (p. 367.8–9).
- two further approaches—one rejected and one endorsed
- One way of dealing with this problem is to say that an action has moral
worth only if the moral motive was so strong that it would have prevailed even
if the cooperating motives had been conflicting ones (p. 368.4). Herman’s
objection to this is somewhat unclear to me. Her problem seems to be that we
should not deny that an agent’s action had moral worth just because, in
different (more onerous) circumstances it would not have been performed (p.
369.6).
- The approach Herman endorses is to say that an action has moral worth only
if the moral motive was, in fact, the motive on which the agent acted (p.
369.8). Two things to notice about this:
- It refers to the motive on which the agent actually acted, rather
than referring to how the agent would have acted under other
circumstances.
- Sometimes it may be hard to tell on what motive someone actually acted,
but this does not mean that this idea—the motive on which someone actually
acted—should not be operative in our thinking about the moral worth of
someone’s action.
- section IV
- morally required vs. morally permissible
- Kant recognizes the distinction, familiar in common-sense morality,
between actions that are morally required and those that are merely
permissible. (For example, once you make a promise to do something for
someone, then, barring exceptional circumstances, you’re morally required to
do it: to keep the promise. But presumably you weren’t morally required to
make the promise in the first place: that was, presumably, merely morally
permissible.)
- Herman, having discussed morally required actions and their connection
with the motive of duty, turns now to actions that are not required, but
merely permissible.
- moral permissibility and moral worth
- Herman asks, in effect, this: what role does the motive of duty play in
actions that are not required, but merely permissible? (p. 372.2) Her answer
is that, in some agents, the motive of duty serves to ensure that what one is
thinking about doing is at least permissible, given that no moral
requirements bear on one just now (p. 372.4).
- But such actions will not have moral worth, since they cannot be done from
duty: it is some other motive which prompts the agent even to consider doing
it, and then the agent checks it against the categorical imperative just to
make sure it’s o.k. (pp. 374.8–375.2). Then the agent is virtuous, but the
action is not morally worthy.
- section V
- In this section Herman goes through the sympathy, self-preservation, and
happiness examples to interpret them in the light of the analysis presented in
the preceding sections.
- Then she reiterates the main message of her paper: “Overdetermined actions
can have moral worth so long as the moral motive has priority over the
satisfaction of inclination” (p. 382.4).
- back to the Groundwork: section II, to p. 421.1
- possible test questions
- (10 points:) What is meant by saying that imperatives, as Kant conceives
of them, are (1) appropriate only for “imperfectly rational” wills and (2)
objectively valid? (To answer the second part of this question you’ll need to
say how imperatives, as Kant conceives of them, are different from
imperatives, as (e.g.) a grammarian would conceive of them.)
- (10 points:) Why is it wrong to say that hypothetical imperatives can be
distinguished from categorical ones by the presence of the word ‘if’ in them
(note: use examples to answer this part of the question), and what is the
right way in which to distinguish hypothetical imperatives from categorical
ones?
- on proceeding a priori rather than a posteriori
- Kant spends the first several pages of this section (from 406 to just
about the middle of p. 412) reiterating and elaborating on the need to proceed
a priori rather than a posteriori.
- theoretical need
- three considerations
- even in regard to humans alone—p. 407.5: “One cannot better serve the
wishes of those who ridicule all morality as the mere phantom of a human
imagination overstepping itself through self-conceit than by granting them
that concepts of duty must be drawn solely from experience.”
- in regard to all rational beings—p. 408.4: “no experience could give
occasion to infer even the possibility of” laws that “must hold not only for
human beings but for all rational beings as such.”
- the circularity problem—p. 408.7: “every example of [morality] represented
to me must itself first be appraised in accordance with principles of
morality, as to whether it is also worthy to serve as an original example,
that is, as a model.”
- consequences of their neglect
- Neglect of these considerations “produces a disgusting hodgepodge of patchwork
observations and half-rationalized principles” (p. 409.8).
- practical need
- p. 410.7: “such a completely isolated metaphysics of morals . . . is also
a desideratum of the utmost importance to the actual fulfillment of their
precepts.”
- p. 410.8: “the pure thought of duty and in general of the moral law, mixed
with no foreign addition of empirical inducements, has . . . an influence on
the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives . . .”
- an examination of “the practical faculty of reason”
- Next Kant examines the capacity to make decisions about how to act.
- He does this in order to discover how the concept of duty may operate
within it (p. 412.7).
- p. 412.8: in accordance with the representation of laws vs. not
- p. 413.5: imperatives—expressed by ‘ought’
- p. 414.3: hypothetical vs. categorical
- p. 415.2: many hypothetical imperatives
- p. 416.3: one categorical imperative (though it is not clear how it is
known at this stage of the discussion that there’s only one)
- p. 417.1: “how are all these imperatives possible?”
- What Kant is asking here is, How is it possible that certain commands can
be validly issued, that is, backed by reason rather than just one person
telling another person what to do?
- pp. 417.2–419.3: basically unproblematic how hypothetical imperatives are
possible, since they are analytic
- the categorical imperative
- p. 419.4: question of the possibility of the categorical imperative in need of an
answer
- p. 420.1: no sure example in experience, so we can’t point to any specific
event and say, “There! The categorical imperative in action!”
- p. 420.5: synthetic a priori, not analytic, thus likely to be hard
to establish
- p. 420.7: establishment of this to be postponed until section III
- Hill, “The Hypothetical Imperative”
- possible test questions—questions 27 and 28, above
- section I
- p. 429.6: statement of the hypothetical imperative
- p. 430.3: distinction between principle of conduct and explication of what
a certain phenomenon consists of
- p. 432.9: first objection (that it can be irrational to take the means to
every end one has)
- p. 433.7: second objection (that the Hypothetical Imperative doesn’t
allow for rational changes of mind about ends)
- p. 435.2: third objection (that the Hypothetical Imperative may require
immoral conduct)
- section II
- two important features of what Kant calls (in translation, of course)
‘imperatives’
- p. 439.3: Imperatives are properly addressed only to “imperfectly
rational” wills.
- p. 439.8–9: Imperatives express principles that are objective—ones to
which any rational person would conform. For Kant, there are no bogus or
invalid imperatives, any more than there are (for example) false true
statements.
- What makes the Hypothetical Imperative a hypothetical imperative?
- p. 441.3: not its form (e.g., inclusion of a conditional clause, such as
one beginning with ‘if’)
- p. 442.3: not the fact that it requires empirical data in order to yield
substantive prescriptions
- p. 443.3: its dependence, in order for it to yield substantive
prescriptions, in information about the agent’s ends
- section III to the bottom of p. 445 (where “positive freedom (autonomy)”
is first mentioned
- p. 445.2: question—Why did Kant lavish so much attention and praise on the
Categorical Imperative, and so little on the Hypothetical Imperative?
- p. 445.3: one difference—it’s easier (in terms of willpower) to follow the
latter
- p. 445.4: another difference—the former is synthetic, the latter merely
analytic
- p. 445.9: the most important difference—the former involves positive
freedom, or autonomy
- back to the Groundwork: section II, pp. 421.1–436.2
- possible test questions
- (10 points:) What is the reasoning by which the first formulation of the
categorical imperative supposedly disallows making a false promise?
- (20 points:) What are the two kinds of contradiction that Kant says can
arise in connection with the categorical imperative, and what do these two
different kinds of contradiction have to do with the two different kinds of
duties that Kant mentions?
- (10 points:) How might the categorical imperative be made to seem, by
clever formulations of agents’ maxims, to be more permissive than Kant
presumably intended?
- (10 points:) How might the categorical imperative be made to seem, by
consideration of suitably chosen examples, to be unreasonably strict?
- (20 points:) What would Kant say if someone said the following? “Kant’s
theory is flawed because I was thinking about performing a certain action, and
when I tested it against one formulation of the categorical imperative, it
came out o.k., but when I tested it against another formulation, it was
prohibited.”
- the categorical imperative
- formulations
- p. 421.3: the autonomy formulation
- p. 421.7: the ‘law of nature’ formulation (supposedly equivalent to
autonomy formulation)
- examples of application
- p. 421.9: suicide
- p. 422.4: false promise
- p. 422.9: cultivation of talents
- p. 423.4: charity
- p. 421.8: the categorizing of the examples
- perfect duties
- to self: duty not to commit suicide (example 1)
- to others: duty not to make false promises (example 2)
- imperfect duties
- to self: duty to cultivate talents (example 3)
- to others: duty to help others (example 4)
- p. 424.2: how to distinguish between perfect and imperfect
- perfect: a “contradiction,” an “inner impossibility,” in the very idea of
universalizing the maxim
- imperfect: a contradiction not in the idea of universalizing the maxim,
but in the will
- interlude: two possible objections
- first objection: the categorical imperative turns out to be too
permissive (it doesn’t have the strict implications Kant thought it had)
- one example: false promise (What if it’s a really special situation?)
- first example: suicide (What’s so inconsistent about a system of nature
including suicide at a certain point?)
- second objection: the categorical imperative turns out to be too strict:
it seems to rule out, as immoral, practices of “making an exception of
oneself” that seem perfectly harmless and morally innocuous
- one example: paying off credit cards on time (an objection from Simon
Blackburn)
- another example: going to college to make more money than people who don’t
- progress report: done and not done (p. 425.1)
- done: shown that duty cannot be found in (merely) hypothetical
imperatives, but only in categorical imperatives
- done: articulated the categorical imperative
- not done: shown it to be knowable a priori
- How can the categorical imperative be thus established (i.e., a priori)?
- p. 425.3–427.7: ignore everything empirical and specific to human nature
- p. 427.8–429.2: explore what is an objective end, not just a subjective
end; this leads to another formulation of the categorical imperative
- the ‘end in itself’ formulation (p. 429.3)
- supposedly meaning the same as the previous ones
- the same examples of application
- p. 429.4: suicide
- p. 429.8: false promise
- p. 430.4: cultivation of talents
- p. 430.7: charity
- the ‘kingdom of ends’ formulation (p. 431.5)
- supposedly meaning the same as the previous ones
- p. 432.5: conspicuous exclusion of “interest” from the will
- p. 432.8: Kant’s great innovation—the agent himself or herself as author
of the moral law
- p. 433.3: autonomy vs. heteronomy
- p. 433.4: kingdom of ends—each person as both member (subject) and sovereign
- p. 434.8: price vs. dignity
- p. 436.2: autonomy as the ground of dignity
- Hill, “Humanity as an End in Itself”
- possible test question
- (10 points:) What, according to Hill, is the usual understanding of the
phrase ‘humanity in a person’ (as it occurs in one of Kant’s formulations of
the categorical imperative), and what understanding does Hill propose?
- p. 85.6: reversing the usual reading
- the usual reading
- Hill’s reversal
- p. 86.3: “‘humanity’ as including only those powers necessarily associated
with rationality and ‘the power to set ends’ ”
- excluded
- “animal” nature
- physical abilities, many mental aptitudes as well
- included
- capacity and disposition to act on principles or maxims (or reasons)
- capacity and disposition to follow hypothetical imperatives
- power to set ends (adopt goals, work towards them, resist temptation,
etc.)
- capacity and disposition to follow categorical imperatives
- ability to understand and reason
- treating humanity as an end
- p. 90.3: consider maxims from the point of view of those treated in accord
with them
- p. 90.7: not “the more literal alternative readings”
- dignity (section III)
- 91.3: ends as things that have dignity
- 93.2: the priority of things with dignity
- practical implications (section IV)
- p. 94.6: drunkenness
- p. 95.3: suicide
- p. 96.7: allowing freedom of choice to others
- contrast with utilitarianism (p. 99.2)
- back to the Groundwork: section II, from p. 436.2 to the end
- possible test question
- (10 points:) What does Kant mean by heteronomy? Why does he regard
heteronomous decision-making as inferior to autonomous decision-making?
- the three formulations considered together (p. 436.3)
- p. 436.4: subjective differences
- p. 436.5: common elements
- form (universality)
- matter (rational beings as ends)
- lawgiving
- autonomy vs. heteronomy
- p. 440.7: principle of autonomy (c.i.) synthetic, not analytic
- varieties of heteronomy
- empirical principles (happiness)
- p. 442.3: “special constitution of human nature”
- p. 442.7: “moral feeling”
- rational principles (perfection)
- p. 443.2: ontological concept
- p. 443.3: theological concept
- p. 443.9: why all these fail
- last paragraph