University of Kansas, Fall 2003
Philosophy 672: History of Ethics
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu

Class notes: Hume

The following notes correspond roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own observations and records of what goes on in class.

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13. editor’s introduction, pp. I9–I15
    1. Hume’s life
       1. Hume was born in 1711 in Edinburgh, and died in 1776.
       2. He published his A Treatise of Human Nature in 1739 and 1740—books I and II in 1739, and book III in 1740.
    2. Hume’s general outlook
       1. moderate scepticism
          1. sceptical of what previous philosophers had said we can know about things like the external world, cause and effect, God, and morality
          2. hopeful of coming to some defensible understanding of human nature—of how the human mind works, what it can and cannot do, what it tends to do and tends not to do
       2. the experimental method
          1. use of experience and observation to draw conclusions about human nature
          2. no assertions regarding anything not knowable via experience and observation
14. book 2, part 3, section 3: “Of the influencing motives of the will”
    1. main argument of this section
       1. Reason can determine how we act only if it can influence the will.
       2. Reason cannot influence the will. (This is shown by the following:
          1. Reason cannot motivate.
          2. Reason cannot interfere with motivations supplied by passions.)
       3. Therefore, reason cannot determine how we act.
    2. that reason cannot motivate (par. 2–3)
       1. the two kinds of reasoning
          1. “demonstration” (par. 2)
             1. includes things knowable without doubt—construe ‘demonstrations’ as proofs, as in mathematical proofs
             2. includes, then, things known as analytical truths—things knowable based on the meanings of words and ideas
             3. obviously not motivating, though useful in many purposes otherwise motivated
          2. “probability” (par. 3)
             1. includes things that are not certain—anything experience-based, such as knowledge of causes and effects
             2. includes, them, things known as synthetic truths—things known by recognizing contingent facts about the world
             3. also cannot motivate, though it can direct a preexisting motivation
       2. neither kind capable of motivating
    3. that reason cannot interfere with motivations supplied by passions (par. 4)
       1. If it could, then it could motivate in the first place, and we have seen that it cannot.
       2. the most famous sentence in the Treatise: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”
    4. when a passion can be called unreasonable (par. 6)
       1. when based on a false belief
          1. false belief in the existence of some object(s)
          2. false belief about means and ends
       2. “and even then ’tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment”
    5. three not-irrational preferences (par. 6)
       1. extreme selfishness
       2. extreme altruism
       3. imprudence
    6. why reason and passion have been thought opposed (par. 8–10)
       1. Some passions are calm passions, not violent ones.
       2. The psychological effects of the calm passions are easily mistaken for those of reason, and so conflicts between violent passions and calm passions are easily mistaken for conflicts between passion and reason.
15. book 3, part 1, section 1: “Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason”
    1. main argument of this section (par. 5–7)
       1. Moral distinctions can determine how we act.
       2. Reason cannot determine how we act.
       3. Therefore, moral distinctions cannot be based on reason.
    2. a further argument based on truth and falsity (par. 9–10)
       1. Reason deals with (i.e., produces and judges) things that can be true or false.
       2. Making a moral judgment is not a matter of thinking something that can be true or false.
       3. Therefore, reason can have nothing to say in regard to moral judgments.
    3. dismissing attempts to relate morality to truth and falsity (par. 11–16)
       1. regarding an action as immoral if it is based on a false belief
       2. regarding an action as immoral if it produces a false belief
    4. morality not based on relations of ideas (par. 18–25)
       1. ingratitude example (par. 24)
       2. incest example (par. 25)
    5. morality not based on matters of fact (par. 26)
    6. deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’ (par. 27)
16. book 3, part 1, section 2: “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral sense”
    1. main claims of this section
       1. “An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind” (par. 3).
       2. There’s not much to be gained by asking whether our capacity to be affected in these ways is natural or not (par. 10).
    2. clarifications of the first claim
       1. The pleasant feelings (of the kind in question, which has yet to be specified) correspond to virtue; the unpleasant ones, to vice (par. 2).
       2. Sentiments of pleasure and pain are of different kinds; not every one, nor even every one associated with characters and actions, is “of that peculiar kind, which makes us praise or condemn” (par. 4).
       3. “‘Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil.”
    3. points related to the second claim
       1. three interpretations of ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ (par. 7–9)
       2. “nothing can be more unphilosophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natural, and vice with what is unnatural” (par. 10).
    4. where this leaves us (par. 11)
       1. We’ve identified what makes things virtuous or vicious—those things that cause the feelings specified above.
       2. Now all we have to do to understand moral judgment is engage in the corresponding psychological inquiry—that of figuring out what things cause the feelings we’re concerned with.
17. book 3, part 2, section 1: “Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?”
    1. main argument of this section
       1. Justice is either a natural virtue or an artificial one.
       2. If justice were a natural virtue, then every just act could be explained in terms of natural motivations.
       3. Not every just act can be explained in terms of natural motivations.
       4. Therefore, justice is an artificial virtue.
    2. clarification of the conclusion
       1. What Hume means by justice is, roughly, respecting property rights. For our purposes, what Hume means by justice is less important than his view of its being an example of an artificial virtue.
       2. A natural virtue is one that is part of human nature and thus is found in all of human experience, such as benevolence.
       3. An artificial virtue is one that is not part of human nature, and thus is not found in all of human experience, but arises in some circumstances.
       4. See Hume’s references to artifice in par. 1 and par. 17.
       5. See the editors’ introduction, pp. I81–I82, for more on this distinction.
    3. clarification of the second premise
       1. Hume considers three main natural motivations.
          1. self-interest
          2. private benevolence (concern for the other party’s interests)
          3. public benevolence (concern for the public interest)
       2. Any naturally virtuous act can be explained in terms of these motivations. For example, any benevolent act can be explained in terms of private benevolence.
    4. clarification of the third premise
       1. Not every just act can be explained in terms of self-interest, private benevolence, or public benevolence.
       2. Therefore, not every just act can be explained in terms of natural motivations. Sometimes, just acts are totally inexplicable except in terms of the agent’s commitment to the convention of justice. On this see par. 9–17, especially par. 9 and par. 17.
18. book 3, part 2, section 2: “Of the origin of justice and property”
    1. par. 2–22: the origin of justice
       1. the advantages of living in society (par. 3)
       2. natural selfishness and limited generosity (par. 5–6)
       3. the scarcity and easy transfer of goods (par. 7)
       4. convention or artifice or artificial virtue of justice (par. 9)
       5. the error of regarding justice as based on a promise (par. 10)
       6. the circumstances of justice (par. 16–21)
          1. qualities of the human mind: its selfishness and limited generosity
          2. situation of external objects: their scarcity
       7. justice as an artificial virtue (par. 22)
    2. par. 23–28: the moral significance of justice
       1. It’s clear enough why people are motivated to behave in conformity to a convention of justice. But why is this a matter of virtue or vice?
       2. Hume’s answer: “as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call’d vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is call’d virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice” (par. 24).
19. book 3, part 2, section 3: “Of the rules, which determine property”
    1. the proposal of allocating property according to need or usefulness (par. 2)
    2. present possession (par. 4)
    3. occupation (par. 6–8)
    4. prescription (par. 9)
    5. accession (par. 10)
    6. succession (par. 11)
20. book 3, part 2, section 4: “Of the transference of property by consent”
    1. a remedy for inconveniences (par. 1)
    2. implemented by symbolism (par. 2)
21. book 3, part 2, section 5: “Of the obligation of promises”
    1. possible test questions
       1. What are Hume’s two arguments for the claim that promising is not naturally intelligible, but is intelligible only as a matter of convention?
       2. What are two of the “contradictions” that “are easily accounted for, if the obligation of promises be merely a human invention for the convenience of society” (par. 13)?
    2. main points of section
       1. first argument for regarding promising as conventional (par. 4)
          1. If promising were naturally intelligible, then promising would be a mental act.
          2. If promising were a mental act, it would be that of willing an obligation—creating an obligation with one’s will.
          3. A mental act could create an obligation only if a mental act could change the sentiments of pleasure and pain an action elicits in an impartial observer.
          4. No mental act can do that.
          5. Therefore, no mental act can create an obligation.
          6. Therefore, promising is not a mental act.
          7. Therefore, promising is not naturally intelligible.
       2. second argument for regarding promising as conventional (par. 6)
       3. why the convention of promising develops (par. 8–12)
       4. evidence, from the way promising works, that it’s a matter of convention (par. 13–15)
22. book 3, part 2, section 6: “Some farther reflections concerning justice and injustice”
    1. possible test question
       3. What are two of Hume’s three “farther reflections concerning justice and injustice”? What conclusion are all three of these “farther reflections” intended, by Hume, to prove?
    2. the three “farther considerations”
       1. no natural motive to comply with every rule of justice
       2. no gradual variations, or differences of mere degree, in matters of justice
       3. no flexibility, or circumstance dependence, in rules of justice
23. book 3, part 2, section 7: “Of the origin of government”
    1. possible test question
       4. What feature of human nature does Hume say mainly creates the need for a government? How does a government remedy this weakness in human nature?
    2. main points of section
       1. humans’ tendency to prefer what is near (in space or time) to what is remote  (par. 2)
       2. humans’ tendency to judge things at a distance based on “whatever is in itself preferable” (par. 5)
       3. how government induces a chance of circumstance (par. 6)
24. book 3, part 2, section 8: “Of the source of allegiance”
    1. possible test question
       5. What widespread belief about the source of allegiance to government does Hume aim to disprove?
    2. main points of section
       1. allegiance and promise-keeping on a par with each other (par. 4)
       2. no promise of allegiance known (par. 9)
25. book 3, part 2, section 9: “Of the measures of allegiance”
    1. possible test question
       6. What reasoning does Hume say is the right explanation for the fact that the duty of allegiance ceases when government becomes tyrannical?
    2. main points of section
       1. interest, not promising, as the sanction of government (end of par. 2, end of par. 4)
       2. general rules requiring allegiance (par. 3)
26. book 3, part 2, section 10: “Of the objects of allegiance”
    1. possible test question
       7. How, according to Hume, are the criteria for whom to obey partly logical, and partly arbitrary?
    2. main points of section
       1. parallel between rules saying whom to obey and rules of property rights (end of par. 3)
       2. “ ’Tis interest which gives the general instinct; but ’tis custom which gives the particular direction.” (par. 4)
       3. customary criteria: long possession (par. 4), present possession (par. 6), conquest (par. 8), succession (par. 9), positive laws (par. 14)
       4. indeterminacy in the system of rules that results from these criteria (par. 14)
27. book 3, part 2, section 11: “Of the laws of nations”
    1. possible test question
       8. What, according to Hume, explains the fact that people are more tolerant of violations of the laws of nations than they are of violations of rules having to do with respecting property rights and keeping promises?
    2. main points of section
       1. the nature of and rationale for the laws of nations (par. 1–2)
       2. why the laws of nations are less binding than the “laws of nature” (par. 4)
28. book 3, part 2, section 12: “Of chastity and modesty”
    1. possible test question
       9. What is Hume’s explanation for the fact that chastity and modesty are valued in regard to women more than in regard to men?
    2. main points of section
       1. motivation: to show how his system explains why chastity and modesty are valued in regard to women more than in regard to men (par. 1)
       2. the social purpose of highly valuing chastity in women (par. 4)
       3. the social purpose of highly valuing modesty in women (par. 5)
29. book 3, part 3, section 1: “Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices”
    1. possible test questions
       10. How, according to Hume, does sympathy enable certain character traits to be virtues and vices?
       11. One of Hume’s claims is that sympathy enables certain character traits to be virtues and vices. How does Hume’s invocation of the idea of a “steady and general poin[t] of view” enable him to reply to two objections that might be made to this claim?
    2. main points of section
       1. sympathy
          1. how it works (par. 7)
          2. “the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues” (par. 9)
       2. how things come to be natural virtues
          1. by contributing to “the good of mankind” (par. 10)
          2. sympathy operative here, too (end of par. 11)
       3. confirmation of this theory
          1. wonderfully lucid review of difference between natural and artificial virtues (par. 12)
          2. stronger operation of same principles in the case of natural virtues (par. 13)
       4. first objection and reply
          1. objection (par. 14)
             1. Sympathy’s force is inversely proportional to distance.
             2. Esteem is not.
             3. Therefore, esteem is not based on sympathy.
          2. reply
             1. esteem based on “some steady and general points of view” (par. 15)
             2. the necessity of such “corrections” (end of par. 16, middle of par. 18)
       5. second objection and reply
          1. objection (par. 19)
             1. We have esteem for some character traits that are ineffectual.
             2. Ineffectual character traits result in nothing to sympathize with.
             3. Therefore, esteem is not based on sympathy.
          2. reply
             1. operation of “General rules” (end of par. 20)
             2. similar “correct[ions]” as before (par. 21)
       6. more confirmation of the essential role of sympathy
          1. explains esteem for people from whom we expect no benefit (par. 25)
          2. explains coincidence of pride and love, humility and hatred (par. 26)
       7. four kinds of virtuous character traits and the view we take of them
          1. qualities useful to others
          2. qualities useful to the possessors
          3. qualities agreeable to others
          4. qualities agreeable to the possessors
          5. “some common point of view” (par. 30)
30. book 3, part 3, section 6: “Conclusion of this book”
    1. possible test questions
       12. How, according to Hume, does his account of morality render not just virtue, but also the sense of virtue, worthy of approval?
    2. main points of section
       1. “sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions” (par. 1)
       2. how this contributes to “defend[ing] the cause of virtue” (par. 3)