University of Kansas, Fall 2003
Philosophy 160: Introduction to Ethics
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu

Class notes: introduction

The following notes correspond roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own observations and records of what goes on in class.

The following outline is designed to be, and is in some Web browsers, collapsible: by clicking on the heading for a section, you can collapse that section or, if it’s already collapsed, make it expanded again. If you want to print some but not all of this outline, collapse the parts you don’t want to print (so that just their top-level headings remain), and then click here to print this frame.

1. introduction to the subject matter of the course
   1. the three areas of ethics, or moral philosophy
      1. an example
         1. To understand the three areas of ethics, it helps to have a specific example in mind. So think, for a moment, about the act of intentionally spreading a computer virus. We can probably all agree that this is a bad thing for someone to do.
         2. We can use this example to talk about the three areas of ethics.
      2. applied ethics
         1. This is the branch of ethics devoted to the study of specific ethical issues.
         2. Regarding our example of spreading a computer virus, an applied ethicist might focus on the ethical dimensions of computer viruses and other kinds of computer-related behavior, such as hacking and spamming.
         3. An applied ethicist with a different specialty might ask whether cloning is all right or whether we ought to treat animals better than we do.
         4. Sometimes applied ethics is associated with the idea of “case studies.”
      3. normative ethics
         1. This is the branch of ethics devoted (mostly) to the development of moral theories: theories that specify, in brief and general terms, what actions, policies, institutions, etc., are morally acceptable. In regard to our example of spreading a computer virus, a normative ethicist would try to come up with a moral theory that deals with this as just one of many different moral problems.
         2. For example, one normative ethicist might defend a theory whose central principle is that the way to act rightly is to do whatever will cause the most happiness. Such a theory would say that what’s wrong with intentionally spreading a computer virus is that is decreases overall happiness in the world by creating frustration for many people and enjoyment for just a few. And this theory would tell us to judge other, wholly unrelated, issues, such as cloning and animal rights, in the same way: by looking at the consequences, in terms of future happiness, of various policies and courses of action.
         3. Another normative ethicist might defend a theory whose central principle is the golden rule. Such a theory would say that intentionally spreading a computer virus is wrong because it involves treating other people in a way that one would not like to be treated oneself: as someone to be inconvenienced just for fun. And his theory would tell us to judge other issues in the same way: in terms of the golden rule.
      4. meta-ethics
         1. This is the branch of ethics devoted to explaining what we are doing when we make moral judgments or engage in moral debates. Meta-ethicists try to give accounts of such things as the meaning of moral terms and the grounds of moral judgments.
         2. Consider, then, the moral judgment, “Intentionally spreading a computer virus is wrong.” In some respects, this judgment has the same structure as an ordinary descriptive statement such as “This book is blue”: it specifies a subject, and then uses the verb ‘is’ to ascribe a property to that subject. This kind of consideration, along with other kinds of considerations, leads some people to think that moral judgments are basically like ordinary descriptive judgments. In other respects, the moral judgment that intentionally spreading a computer virus is wrong is like the imperative “Don’t spread computer viruses.” At least, it functions sort of like that in conversation. This is the sort of thing that belongs to meta-ethics: whether moral judgments are like descriptive statements, such as “This book is blue,” or are like imperatives, such as “Don’t spread computer viruses.”
         3. Whatever a meta-ethicist ends up saying about the statement “Intentionally spreading a computer virus is wrong,” she would probably also say about moral statements on other topics, such as “Cloning is not immoral” or “We ought to treat animals better than we do.”
   2. areas of philosophy
      1. (You will not be held responsible for knowing this material—it’s just to help you get oriented.)
      2. moral philosophy, or ethics: the study of right and wrong, or of how we ought to live, or of what people’s duties and obligations are
      3. metaphysics: the study of things such as what exists, what it is for one event to cause another, etc.
      4. epistemology: the study of knowledge, when a belief may be regarded as knowledge and not just conjecture or opinion, etc.
      5. philosophy of language: the study of what makes words have meanings, how words refer to things in the world (if they do), etc.
      6. philosophy of mind: the study of what mental states are, how they differ, how they represent the world (if they do), etc.
      7. philosophy of science: the study of what makes something a science, how scientific theories are confirmed, what makes something alive, etc.
      8. philosophy of religion: the study of God, whether God exists, faith versus reason, etc.
      9. logic: the study of correct reasoning
      10. others (aesthetics, political philosophy, etc.)
2. introduction to the mechanics of the course
   1. review of syllabus
   2. a strategy for reading effectively before class
      1. read actively
         1. look for the author’s purpose
         2. ask yourself, “Why did the author write this chapter? How is he or she trying to affect my mind?”
      2. take notes
         1. major divisions of the chapter
         2. important sentences
         3. places where (what seem to be) important concepts are introduced and clarified
         4. places where things are said that you want to ask about
   3. what the lectures will be like
      1. rules
         1. cell phones off, no newspaper-reading, no conspicuous sleeping
         2. sit at the back if you come late or will be leaving early
         3. o.k. with me: eating or drinking quietly, dozing off
         4. general principle: if it’s distracting to me or other students, it’s a problem; if not, it’s not a problem
      2. purposes and contents
         1. to complement other parts of the course, not to disseminate the bulk of the information
         2. to shed light on the hardest parts of the reading, not to recapitulate it evenly
         3. to talk about things that aren’t in the reading, such as writing
      3. how I prepare to lecture, and then lecture
         1. prepare my lecture notes
         2. put them on the course web site
         3. print them out
         4. come to class
         5. lecture from the notes I’ve printed out
         6. sometimes make minor corrections
      4. some consequences
         1. Sometimes the notes from which I’ll be lecturing on a given day won’t be ready (i.e., on the web site) until right before class.
         2. The notes from which I’ll be lecturing on a given day will be available as of class time and afterwards.
      5. what’s on the web site versus what I say
         1. As I indicated, I lecture from the same notes that I put on the web site. So just about everything I say in class will be associated with some part of those notes.
         2. Often, though, what I say in class on a particular topic will be more detailed than my notes are. In some cases, my notes may just contain a word or phrase that will refer to a topic that I’ll spend several minutes talking about. So the notes you take in class will end up being more detailed, in certain places, than the notes on the web.
         3. It will frequently happen that I skip certain topics that are in my notes. This is because in the past, I’ve said things in lectures that I now think do not need to be said in lectures, but that my still be useful for you to read.
         4. To help you match up the things I say in class to the parts of my notes, I’ll try to say, in class, what part of my notes I’m currently talking about.
   4. a strategy for managing your notes and consolidating your knowledge
      1. type or re-write your notes after class, filling in gaps while the material is still fresh
      2. use your notes to elaborate on my notes
         1. one way of doing this: copy my notes to a word-processing file (highlighting outline, not collapsing it), and copy and paste your notes into the appropriate places
         2. another way: print out my notes (printing notes, not printing contents column) and use labels (like endnotes) to refer to your notes
      3. re-read the assigned chapter, revising the notes you took earlier
      4. integrate those revised notes with your typed or re-written notes from class (the ones you used to elaborate on my notes)
3. EMP, preface (pp. ix–x)
   1. There are some fields, such as physics, in which there is a large body of material that competent theorists or practitioners all agree is right. Of course, physicists have some disagreements among one another—there is still stuff to be figured out that different physicists have conflicting opinions about—just as historians do not all agree on exactly what happened in certain times and places in the past, and just as economists do not all agree on what the best account of economic activity is. But in all of these fields, there is a lot of fairly uncontroversial material.
   2. Philosophy is not like this; in philosophy there is very little that is uncontroversial. So in this course we will be exploring many conflicting views. None of them will be presented as the “truth”; rather, for the most part, we’ll seek to understand the reasons for and against them. Ultimately, you must try to decide for yourself what views have the strongest reasons in support of them; my job will be to help you to identify and weigh those reasons.
4. EMP, chapter 1: “What Is Morality?”
   1. overviews of sections 1.1–1.4
      1. section 1.1: “The Problem of Definition”
         1. the idea of the minimum conception of morality: what just about everyone agrees on, as far as morality is concerned, despite whatever disagreements people may have about morality 
         2. the point of considering some specific cases: to identify some features of this “minimum conception of morality”
      2. section 1.2: “First Example: Baby Theresa”
         1. transplantation or not?
         2. for transplantation: benefits (to other babies)
         3. against transplantation: it’s “using” the baby. (But does it matter if she is “used,” if her autonomy is not violated?)
         4. against transplantation: wrongness of killing. (But is killing always wrong? And might it be claimed that the baby is already dead?)  
      3. section 1.3: “Second Example: Jodie and Mary”
         1. surgery or not?
         2. for surgery: save as many as possible
         3. against surgery: sanctity of human life
      4. section 1.4: “Third Example: Tracy Latimer”
         1. killing justified or not?
         2. in defense: quality of life
         3. against: wrongness of discriminating against the handicapped. (But is it really discrimination, or a reasonable distinction?)
         4. against: slippery slope (unverifiable predictions?)
   2. chapter goal, problem, and solution
      1. goal: to say what morality is
      2. problem: little agreement on what morality is
      3. solution: look at opposing positions on several controversies, and see what they have in common
   3. the solution implemented
      1. examination of cases of Theresa, Jodie and Mary, and Tracy Latimer
      2. two things apparently held in common by all disputants (section 1.5)
         1. the dependence of moral judgments on good reasons
            1. This is the idea that moral judgments must be backed by good reasons (in contrast to, say, judgments of taste). Mere “gut reactions” are not enough. 
            2. Good reasons can be separated from bad ones by being careful about the facts of a case, but this is not sufficient: people can agree on all the facts but still reach different moral judgments.
         2. the requirement of impartiality
            1. This is the idea that moral thinking must count everyone’s interests equally.
            2. This idea may be seen as a consequence of the dependence of moral judgments on good reasons, since there seem to be no good reasons for not counting everyone’s interests equally.
   4. section 1.6: “The Minimum Conception of Morality”
      1. These “lessons” from the three cases furnish the ingredients for a basic characterization of morality: Morality is the effort to guide one’s conduct by reason while giving equal weight to the interests of each individual who will be affected by one’s conduct (p. 14).
      2. Note: this is not a definition, but Rachels’s view of what any reasonable theory of morality must say. Most theories of morality do say this; but there is a lot of disagreement in regard to what reasons are good ones and in regard to what impartiality really amounts to.
      3. As a result, this minimum conception of morality ends up providing very little guidance in making moral judgments. To see this, note that just about everyone on both sides of the controversies discussed in this chapter would agree with it (i.e., would agree that moral judgments must be based on reason, and must be impartial). Rachels, of course, realizes this; he isn’t touting the “minimum conception of morality” as the answer to all our moral questions. Rather, his point (indeed the point of the whole chapter) is to see whether there is some core of morality, common to partisans on opposite sides of various issues. He finds that there is such a core; but that since it is common to folks with such disparate views, it can’t be expected to settle much.
   5. true or false?
      1. When Rachels gives his account of the “minimum conception of morality,” he acknowledges that he‘s saying something pretty controversial, like most things in philosophy.
      2. People who endorse Rachels’s account of the “minimum conception of morality” will typically agree on what should be done in cases such as those discussed in this chapter.
      3. People who endorse Rachels’s account of the “minimum conception of morality” may well disagree on what it means to guide one’s conduct by reason, or to give equal weight to everyone’s interests.
      4. Rachels could have used non-medical examples, indeed a whole different set of examples, to come up with his “minimum conception of morality.”
   6. answers
      1. false
      2. false
      3. true
      4. true
5. interlude: an introduction to arguments
   1. arguments
      1. definition
         • An argument is a set of statements, one of which is understood to be the conclusion, and the others of which are understood to be premises, with the premises being offered as supporting, or providing reasons for, the conclusion.
      2. an example of an argument
         1. (P1:) To discriminate against someone because of his or her handicap is wrong.
         2. (P2:) What Robert Latimer did was to discriminate against someone—his daughter—because of her handicap.
         3. (C:) What Robert Latimer did was wrong.
      3. Every argument has at least one premise, but there is no limit to how many it can have. Every argument has exactly one conclusion.
   2. validity
      1. A valid argument is one whose conclusion cannot be false if its premises are true. That is, it is one whose premises imply, or entail, its conclusion. We often say that it is one whose conclusion “follows from” its premises.
      2. an example of a valid argument
         • See the example of an argument, above. That’s a valid argument.
      3. an example of an invalid argument
         1. (P1:) People don’t like what Robert Latimer did.
         2. (C:) What Robert Latimer did was wrong.
      4. A valid argument may have a true conclusion or a false one; likewise, its premises may all or true, or some of them may be true, or none of them may be true. The same goes for invalid arguments.
   3. soundness
      1. A sound argument is a valid one whose premises are true.
      2. It follows that the conclusion of any sound argument is true, too.
   4. valid or invalid? if valid, sound or unsound?
      1. first argument
         1. (P1:) Lawrence was founded in 1922.
         2. (P2:) If Lawrence was founded in 1922, then it is less than 100 years old.
         3. (C:) Lawrence is less than 100 years old.
      2. second argument
         1. (P1:) Either Kansas in the U.S. or France is.
         2. (P2:) France is not in the U.S.
         3. (C:) Kansas is in the U.S.
      3. third argument
         1. (P1:) Denver is in Colorado.
         2. (P2:) Las Vegas is in Nevada.
         3. (C:) Denver is in Colorado and Las Vegas is in Nevada and Los Angeles is in California.
   5. answers
      1. valid but not sound
      2. valid—and sound, too
      3. invalid