University of Kansas, Fall 2004
Philosophy 160: Introduction to Ethics
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu

“Famine, Affluence, and Morality”

The are two things in this article I want to focus on.

The first is the main argument of the paper, which we find presented on pp. 230–231. This argument actually has two versions, corresponding to two versions Singer gives of its second premise. Here is the first version of the argument:

1. premise (p. 231.2): “[S]uffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.”
2. premise (p. 231.3): “[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” (Below, we’ll refer to this statement as ‘O’, for ‘original’.)
3. conclusion (p. 230.8): “[T]he way people in relatively affluent countries react to a situation like that in Bengal cannot be justified.”

Here is the second version of the argument, differing only in virtue of having a different second premise:

1. [same first premise]
2. premise (p. 231.7): “[I]f it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.” (Below, we’ll refer to this statement as ‘R’, for ‘revised’.)
3. [same conclusion]

We can better understand the two versions of the second premise by considering the following table. Here are what the column labels mean:

• SA–: a sacrifice of lesser moral importance than bad thing A (see below)
• S__: a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to bad thing __
  (For example, SA stands for a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to bad thing A, specified in the table; SB stands for a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to bad thing B; and so on.)

This table lists six bad things and seven (unspecified) sacrifices that one might make in order to prevent those bad things from happening. A couple of notes:

1. The line between the things labeled ‘bad’ and the things labeled ‘very bad’ could be drawn in a different place, depending on what sorts of things you regard as bad enough to be very bad. We don’t have to settle the question of exactly where the line should be drawn—any line will do.
2. The line between the things labeled ’morally insignificant sacrifices’ and ‘morally significant sacrifices’ could also be drawn in a different place. One reason for putting it in the way shown is to emphasize that the line between what is morally insignificant and morally significant needn’t match up with the line between what is merely bad and what is very bad. Here, some things that are merely bad, but not very bad, are still morally significant (namely, having an 8:30 class for a whole semester and not having cable TV for a year).

To improve your understanding of the two versions of premise 2, do the following:

1. Go through the forty-two empty boxes, one by one.
2. If the original version of premise 2 would require you to make a sacrifice of the kind indicated at the top of the column you’re in, in order to prevent the bad (or very bad) thing indicated at the left of the row you’re in, put the letter ’O’ in the box. (Leave room for another letter, as mentioned in step 4.) Otherwise, leave it blank.
3. Go back through the forty-two boxes, one by one.
4. If the revised version of premise 2 would require you to make a sacrifice of the kind indicated, in order to prevent the thing indicated at the left, put the letter ‘R’ in the box. Otherwise, leave it blank.

What do you notice about what the revised principle requires, versus what the original principle requires? Compared to the original principle, the revised principle is (choose one)

1. more demanding in some cases, but less demanding in others
2. more demanding in some cases, and less demanding in none
3. less demanding in some cases, and more demanding in none

The second thing in this article I want to focus on is Singer’s discussion of redrawing the line between the obligatory and the supererogatory. Consider the following actions, which everyone would regard as good:

Now, in each of the five empty boxes in the ‘CSM’ column, do the following:

1. If the action is considered obligatory by common-sense morality—if the action is one it would be wrong not to do—then put the letter ‘O’ in the box.
2. If the action is considered supererogatory by common-sense morality—if the action is one it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do—then put the letter ‘S’ in the box.

Now do the same thing in the ‘SMT’ column, replacing common-sense morality with Singer’s moral theory.

What do you notice about where Singer’s moral theory draws the line between the obligatory and the supererogatory, versus where common-sense morality draws the line? Compared to common-sense morality, Singer’s moral theory (choose one)

1. is less demanding: it regards, as supererogatory, some things that common-sense morality regards as obligatory
2. is equally demanding: it regards, as obligatory, the same things that common-sense morality regards as obligatory
3. is more demanding: it regards, as obligatory, some things that common-sense morality regards as supererogatory