University of Kansas, Fall 2002
Philosophy 880: Topics in Ethics
Ben Eggleston—eggleston@ku.edu
Contemporary
Consequentialism
Description: This course will be an examination of
contemporary consequentialism, with attention to both current consequentialist theories
and the most influential objections they face. We will take the theory of R. M.
Hare (as expressed in Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point and related
papers) to represent orthodox act-consequentialism, with the view of Brad Hooker
(as found in Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-consequentialist Theory of Morality)
representing the leading revisionist approach. Objections to be considered primarily
concern the psychology of the consequentialist agent, raising questions such as
(1) whether such an agent could truly be happy or effectively promote the happiness
of others (the alleged self-defeat of consequentialism) and (2) whether such an
agent could have integrity or exhibit other virtues. A provisional list of authors
to be considered in this connection would include Michael Stocker, Gregory Kavka,
Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf, Derek Parfit, and Peter Railton.
Class Schedule: Mondays,
2:30–4:20, in 3097 Wescoe Hall.
Requirements/Grading:
Here are the factors that will determine your overall grade, and their
weights:
- written work: 70 percent
- a presentation on the assigned reading for one day: 20 percent
- helpful and intelligent participation in class discussions: 10 percent
Your written work can take any of several forms, but in any case will add up
to about 20 pages. You may write
- a term paper of about 20 pages, due on December 16 (70 percent);
- a book review of about 5–6 pages, due on November 11 (20 percent), and a paper of about 14–15 pages,
due on December 16
(50 percent); or
- two papers of about 10 pages each, due on November 11 and December 16 (35 percent each).
The papers referred to in the first two options (i.e., the papers of more
than 10 pages) should be on topics that you propose to me and that I approve.
You are not required to consult me about your plans for a book review or for
10-page papers (except to get me to approve your choice of a book to review),
though you are certainly welcome, indeed encouraged, to do so. Following are
some books of the kind that I would approve for reviewing; note that these are
just examples and that you should explore the literature yourself in order to
find something that meshes nicely with your interests.
- R. M. Hare, (Oxford University Press, 1997)
- R. M. Hare, (Oxford University Press, 1999)
- Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, (Harvard University Press, 2002)
- Susan Mendus, (Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Tim Mulgan, (Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Henry Sidgwick, (Oxford University Press, 1998)
- Henry Sidgwick, (Oxford University Press, 2001)
If you have a disability for which you may be requesting special services or
accommodations for this course, be sure to contact
Disability Resources (22 Strong Hall / 864-2620 (V/TTY)), if you have not already
done so, and have that office send me a letter documenting the accommodations to
which you are entitled. Please also see me privately, at your earliest
convenience, so that I can be aware of your situation and can begin to prepare
the appropriate accommodations in advance of receiving the letter from
Disability Resources.
In addition, I should note here that I take academic misconduct, especially
cheating on tests and plagiarizing papers, extremely seriously, and am generally
disposed to impose the harshest permissible penalties when it occurs. To enable
you to meet my expectations in this regard and to do so without fear of
inadvertently falling short of them, I will provide clear and specific guidance
as to what does and does not constitute academic misconduct in advance of tests
and when papers are assigned. Meanwhile, you may consult
article 2, section 6
of the University Senate Rules and Regulations for university policy in
regard to this matter.
Finally, you should feel free to come by my office (3070 Wescoe Hall) at any
time. I have office hours on Fridays from 1:30 to
2:20, but you are also welcome to stop by at other times, either with an
appointment or without. I spend most of the work week in and around my office,
so your chances of finding me should be reasonably high; and although in rare
cases I may have to ask you to come back at another time, in general I will be
happy to speak to you at your convenience.
Books to buy:
- R. M. Hare, (Oxford University Press, 1981; also on reserve in Watson
library [as of 9/12/02, at least]—ask for call no. BJ1012.H3135 1981)
-
Brad Hooker, Ideal Code: Real World:
A Rule-consequentialist Theory of Morality (Oxford University Press,
2001; also on reserve in Watson library [as of 9/12/02, at least]—ask for call
no. BJ1031.H755 2000)
Background reading:
- I assume that everyone in the course
will be conversant in the central concepts and theories of ethics. But just in
case anyone would like to have a look at a very basic introduction to philosophy,
I will mention James
Rachels’s
The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 4th ed.
(McGraw-Hill, 2002; also I have requested that the edition of this owned
by KU, the 2nd one, be put on reserve in Watson library in connection with my
course Philosophy 672, but as of 9/12/02 it had been checked out previously
and had been recalled, but had not been returned yet).
- If you know your way around ethics
but would like to do some reading to better prepare you for this particular course,
I enthusiastically recommend William H. Shaw’s
Contemporary
Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism (Blackwell Publishers, 1998;
not listed in the library’s holdings, alas, but still in print). This is by far
the best introduction to consequentialism, and hence the best prolegomenon to
this course, that I know of.
- Another good introduction to consequentialism
is J. J. C. Smart’s essay “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics,” in
Utilitarianism: For and Against
(Cambridge University Press, 1973; also on reserve in Watson library [as of
9/12/02, at least]—ask for call no. B843.S6), by Smart and
Bernard Williams. Although Smart’s essay’s coverage
of utilitarianism is not as thorough, even, or up-to-date as is that of Shaw’s
book, it is short and very readable, and it has been somewhat important in the modern
history of utilitarian thought.
Using J-Stor:
Some of the hyperlinks in the schedule below are to articles that are
available electronically from the J-Stor online journal archive. J-Stor’s home
page—www.jstor.org—can be accessed by anyone, but the contents of its archives
cannot be legitimately accessed without a subscription. KU has a subscription,
and you can use this subscription to access the J-Stor archive in either of two
ways:
- While using a computer with a KU IP address (which I imagine would be any
of the on-campus computers—e.g., in the computer labs, in the libraries,
etc.), just click on the link for the article you’re interested in. It should
appear with no problem.
- While using a non-KU computer, follow these steps:
- Go to http://www2.lib.ku.edu:2065/.
- Unless you are already logged into the KU libraries’ server, you will be
confronted with a log-in screen. Log in with your KU username and password.
- When the J-Stor screen appears, use “Search” or “Browse” to find the
article, based on the bibliographic information supplied below.
Once you have the article on the screen, you will probably want to print it.
Look for the gray “PRINT” link at the top of the page you’re viewing, and
click on it. You’ll then be given further instructions and links. In order to
print J-Stor articles, the computer you’re using needs to have installed on it
either (1) the Adobe Acrobat Reader (installed on most or all campus computers,
and downloadable free from Adobe; see the link on my home page) or (2) J-Stor’s
own printing application (details available with J-Stor’s instructions for
printing; click on “Set your printing preferences” after clicking on the “PRINT”
link).
Schedule:
August 26:
- Introduction (no assigned reading)
September 2:
September 9:
The readings for today—all fairly well-known papers—raise the first of the two
objections to consequentialism mentioned above (in the course description): that
is, that consequentialism is self-defeating in the sense that agents who
subscribe to consequentialist moral theories tend to bring about worse outcomes
than agents who subscribe to non-consequentialist theories do.
- Michael Stocker, “The
Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy
vol. 73, no. 14 (August 12, 1976), pp. 453–466. (When you are getting this article
from J-Stor or a bound volume in the library, you may notice
R. M. Adams’s “Motive
Utilitarianism” as the article immediately following this one. That would
be well worth reading, too, though it is not strictly part of our agenda.)
- Gregory Kavka, “Some
Paradoxes
of Deterrence,” The Journal of Philosophy vol. 75, no. 6 (June
1978), pp. 285–302
- Susan Wolf, “Moral
Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy vol. 79, no. 8 (August 1982), pp.
419–439. (This paper is discussed by William Shaw in Contemporary Ethics: Taking
Account of Utilitarianism, on pp. 263–265.)
September 16:
Williams’s essay has been very influential in the debate over utilitarianism; it is
the locus classicus for the second of the two objections to
consequentialism mentioned above: that is, that consequentialist agents cannot
have integrity or exhibit other virtues. If you have time, you might benefit
from reading the whole of Williams’s critique (it goes through p. 150).
Also, if you’re particularly engaged by the issues found in Harris’s paper,
you might want to look at Arthur M. Wheeler’s “On Moral Nose” (Philosophical
Quarterly vol. 27, no. 108 [July 1977], pp. 249–253).
September 23:
With the two main objections that concern us now in view, we turn to the
consequentialist theory developed by R. M. Hare. This theory, though firmly in
the orthodox act-consequentialist tradition, is more sophisticated than its most
prominent predecessors, and offers responses (sometimes explicitly, sometimes
implicitly) to the foregoing objections.
- R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking, preface
(pp. v–vii)
- M.T., chapter 1: “Introduction”
(pp. 1–24)
- M.T., chapter 2: “Moral Conflicts”
(pp. 25–43)
- M.T., chapter 3: “The Archangel
and the Prole” (pp. 44–64)
- presentation by Matt Waldschlagel
I strongly suggest that, before getting
into Moral Thinking, you read Hare’s 1989 essay “The Structure of Ethics
and Morals,” in Hare’s Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford University Press,
1989, but possibly out of print; also on reserve in Watson library [as of
9/12/02, at least]—ask for call no. BJ1012.H2925 1989), pp. 175–190,
a brief and very clear introduction to his approach to moral philosophy.
Hare died earlier this year; here
are links to the obituaries of him published in the
The New
York Times (log-in required), the (London)
Independent,
and the (London)
Guardian. Each offers a brief account of Hare’s thought. (Thanks to
Arts & Letters Daily for these links.)
September 30:
- Moral Thinking, chapter 4:
“Descriptivism and the Error Theory” (pp. 65–86)
- M.T., chapter 5: “Another’s
Sorrow” (pp. 87–106)
- M.T., chapter 6: “Universalization”
(pp. 107–116)
October 7:
- Moral Thinking, chapter 7:
“Interpersonal Comparison” (pp. 117–129)
- M.T., chapter 8: “Loyalty and Evil
Desires” (pp. 130–146)
- M.T., chapter 9: “Rights and Justice”
(pp. 147–168)
- presentation by Jorge Muñoz
October 14:
- Moral Thinking, chapter 10: “Fanaticism
and Amoralism” (pp. 169–187)
- M.T., chapter 11: “Prudence, Morality and
Supererogation” (pp. 188–205)
- M.T., chapter 12: “Objectivity and Rationality”
(pp. 206–228)
October 21:
Before leaving Hare’s theory we turn to an objection to it offered by
Williams—one closely related to his integrity objection, in being concerned in a
certain way with the psychology of the consequentialist agent—and Hare’s
response.
- Bernard Williams, “The Structure of Hare’s Theory,”
in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion (eds.), Hare and Critics: Essays on
Moral Thinking (Oxford University Press, 1988, but possibly out of print;
also on reserve in Watson library [as of 9/12/02, at least]—ask for call no. BJ1012.H31353 H37 1988), pp. 185–196
- Hare, “Comments on Williams” (in Hare and Critics, pp. 287–293)
- presentation by Dan Hieber
The gist of Williams’s paper finds briefer expression
in his earlier
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1985;
also on reserve in Watson library in connection with my course Philosophy 672
[as of 9/12/02]—ask for call no. BJ1012.W52); see pp. 106–110. It finds even earlier, and briefer,
expression in the last two paragraphs of section 6, “The indirect pursuit of utility,”
of Williams’s “A Critique of Utilitarianism.”October 28:
In the decades since the publication of Moral Thinking, there have been
published many papers on the integrity objection to consequentialism and on
related issues, such as the possibility of consequentialist agents’ exhibiting
other virtues, such as friendship. We’ll spend the next two meetings discussing
some of these papers.
- Peter Railton, “Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” (Philosophy & Public
Affairs vol. 13, no. 2 [Spring 1984], pp. 134–171)
- David Brink, “Utilitarian
Morality and the Personal Point of View” (The Journal of Philosophy
vol. 83, no. 8 [August 1986], pp. 417–438)
- Neera
Kapur Badhwar, “Why
It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship”
(Ethics vol. 101, no. 3 [April 1991], pp. 483–504)—presentation by Matt
Waldschlagel
November 4:
November 11:
So far we’ve considered orthodox act consequentialism and its relation to
objections having to do with self-defeat, integrity, and other virtues such as
friendship. We now turn to a type of consequentialist theory that tends to
appear much less vulnerable to such objections, because of the way in which the
practical prescriptions of theories of this type tend to differ from the
practical prescriptions of act-consequentialist theories. Brad Hooker’s
rule-consequentialist theory is currently the most prominent of these
revisionist consequentialist theories.
- Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, chapter 1: “Introduction” (pp.
1–31)
- I.C., R.W., chapter 2: “What Are the Rules to Promote?” (pp. 32–71)
- presentation by Eric Berg
November 18:
- Ideal Code, Real World, chapter 3: “Questions of Formulation” (pp.
72–92)
- I.C., R.W., chapter 4: “Is Rule-consequentialism Guilty of Collapse
or Incoherence?” (pp. 93–111)
- I.C., R.W., chapter 5: “Predictability and Convention” (pp.
112–125)
- presentation by Lindsey Porter
November 25:
- Ideal Code, Real World, chapter 6: “Prohibitions and Special
Obligations” (pp. 126–141)
- I.C., R.W., chapter 7: “Act-consequentialism” (pp. 142–158)
- I.C., R.W., chapter 8: “Rule-consequentialism and Doing Good for
the World” (pp. 159–174)
- I.C., R.W., chapter 9: “Help with Practical Problems” (pp. 175–187)
- I.C., R.W., afterword (pp. 188–189)
- presentation by Dawn Gale
December 2:
The differences between Hooker’s theory and Hare’s can be traced back to
questions of method and of criteria of adequacy for moral theories. Hooker is a devoted follower of reflective equilibrium, whereas Hare was always one of its staunchest critics. The method itself
has been considered in depth in multiple papers by Norman Daniels and Michael
DePaul.
December 9:
Although the act/rule divide has been regarded as pretty fundamental in
consequentialism since (at the latest) the middle of the last century, some
recent work suggests some limitations inherent in this way of thinking. Our
final two papers are of this kind.
- Philip
Pettit and Michael Smith,
“Global Consequentialism,” in Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason, and Dale Miller
(eds.), Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader (Edinburgh
University Press, 2000; also on reserve in Watson library [as of 9/12/02, at
least]—ask for call no. B843.M67 2000b), pp. 121–133
- Shelly Kagan,
“Evaluative Focal Points,” in Hooker et al., pp. 134–153
- presentation by Jorge Muñoz